Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited by Sepe, Simone M.
  
 
1377 
Article 
Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited 
Simone M. Sepe† 
Introduction  ........................................................................... 1378 
I. Whither Corporate Model?  .......................................... 1386 
A.  Board Primacy and Shareholder Primacy  ........... 1386 
B.  The Rise of Empowered Shareholders  ................. 1391 
II. Adverse Selection in the Shareholder-Manager 
Relationship  ................................................................. 1395 
A.  Reassessing the Optimal Allocation of Power 
Debate  ................................................................... 1396 
B.  Hidden Actions and Hidden Knowledge  .............. 1399 
C.  On the Impossibility of Assuming Away Adverse 
Selection  ................................................................ 1403 
1.  The Lack of Ex Ante Separating Mechanisms 1405 
2.  The Limits of Incentive Compensation  .......... 1408 
III. The Moral Hazard-Adverse Selection Tradeoff  .......... 1412 
A.  Shareholder Removal in the Shadow of Adverse 
Selection  ................................................................ 1412 
B Uninformative Market Prices  .............................. 1414 
C.  Strategic Signaling  ............................................... 1416 
IV. Toward a New Corporate Model  ................................. 1419 
A.  Time-Consistent Removal Decisions  .................... 1420 
B.  The Limits of Shareholder Empowerment  .......... 1424 
 
†  Professor of Law and Finance, James E. Rogers College of Law, Uni-
versity of Arizona; and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse—Foundation 
Jean-Jacques Laffont—Toulouse School of Economics. E-mail address: 
sms234@email.arizona.edu. Andrea Attar, Ian Ayres, Omri Ben-Shahar, Mar-
garet Brinig, Jacques Crémer, Dhammika Dharmapala, Jesse Fried, Ezra 
Friedman, Ron Gilson, Tom Ginsburg, Joe Grundfest, Henry Hansmann, Dan-
iel Hemel, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Louis Kaplow, Dan Kelly, Andrew 
Koppelman, Saul Levmore, Saura Masconale, Mark McKenna, Bob 
Mundheim, Oliver Hart, Eric Posner, Patrick Rey, Alan Schwartz, Matthew 
Spitzer, Jean Tirole, Avishalom Tor, David Weisbach, Stephen Yelderman, 
and participants at the University of Chicago Law School Work-in-Progress 
luncheon series and the University of Notre Dame Law School Faculty Series 
provided helpful comments. Copyright © 2017 by Simone M. Sepe. 
  
1378 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1377 
 
C.  Virtues and Vices of Biased Boards  ..................... 1427 
D Strong Boards, Strong Shareholders  ................... 1430 
V. Policy Implications  ...................................................... 1432 
A.  Directions of Change  ............................................. 1433 
1.  Short Term and Long Term Defined  .............. 1433 
2.  Higher-Order Constraints and Finite Board 
Protection  ......................................................... 1435 
B.  Means of Change  ................................................... 1439 
Conclusion  .............................................................................. 1444 
Appendix  ................................................................................ 1446 
A.  Setting and Main Assumptions  ............................ 1446 
B.  Incentive Compensation and Adverse Selection... 1448 
C.  Short-Term Removal and Strategic Signaling  .... 1449 
D.  The Value of Time-Consistent Removal  .............. 1452 
E.  Beneficial and Excessive Board’s Bias  ................. 1454 
  INTRODUCTION   
Perhaps no other debate in corporate law has been as per-
sistent as the debate on the optimal allocation of power be-
tween boards and shareholders. Since the days of Berle and 
Means,1 the opposing sides have disputed whether exclusive 
board authority or enhanced shareholder rights are better suit-
ed to balance the tradeoff between efficient centralized man-
agement and the risk of sub-optimal managerial effort.2 In the 
jargon of economists, this risk is known as managerial moral 
hazard.3 For defenders of the traditional board-centric model, 
the board’s informational advantage and shareholders’ collec-
tive action problems provide the key economic arguments for 
privileging board power.4 Conversely, shareholder advocates 
claim that shareholders, as residual claimants, are better 
placed than directors to effectively control managerial moral 
hazard, since directors may be “captured” by opportunistic 
managers.5 
 
 1. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6, 84–89 (rev. ed. 1967). 
 2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: 
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014) (de-
scribing the existing balance between boards and shareholders). 
 3. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF 
INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 3 (2001) (defining moral hazard as 
the agent taking “an action unobserved by the principal”). 
 4. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. 
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The debate also shows no signs of waning. On the contrary, 
in today’s corporate environment, the debate has intensified 
due to recent developments—such as the rise of hedge fund ac-
tivism—which have shifted the balance of corporate power from 
boards to shareholders.6 Board advocates view this change as 
harming U.S. corporations. They describe hedge funds as impa-
tient investors whose only aim is boosting a target’s short-term 
stock price, regardless of whether it comes at the expense of 
long-term value creation.7 In stark contrast, shareholder advo-
cates dismiss the risk of short-termism as marginal relative to 
the benefits brought about by the ability of hedge funds to use 
governance levers effectively to keep directors and managers 
accountable.8 
Proponents of both models, however, agree at least on one 
thing. Managerial moral hazard is recognized across-the-board 
as the information problem of corporate governance.9 Disa-
greement is limited merely to whether board power or share-
holder power best mitigates this problem. 
This Article offers a novel theory of the optimal division of 
power between boards and shareholders, arguing that share-
holders face problems of adverse selection in addition to classic 
problems of managerial moral hazard. Moral hazard arises 
when a manager takes “hidden actions” that deviate from op-
timal project selection.10 Adverse selection, instead, arises when 
a manager’s “hidden knowledge” of her skills or the transac-
tional environment makes shareholders unable to separate 
“good” managers, who respond to incentives for optimal project 
selection, from “bad” ones.11 The coexistence of these infor-
mation problems points to a much broader governance tradeoff 
 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production The-
ory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (arguing that the 
dominant view in contemporary discussions of corporate governance is that 
the “central economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing ‘agen-
cy costs’ by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders’ inter-
ests”); see also Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Re-
ality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2013) (describing the shareholder-
manager agency costs as the master problem of corporate law); Roberta Ro-
mano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 929 
(1984) (describing the challenge of aligning managerial incentives with share-
holder desires as the central corporate law issue).  
 10. See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 3. 
 11. See id. 
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than conventionally understood: attempting to mitigate adverse 
selection issues might conflict with trying to control managerial 
moral hazard, introducing distortions in the incentives provid-
ed to good managers for optimal project selection. 
Examined against this broader governance tradeoff, nei-
ther the traditional board-centric model nor the shareholder 
primacy model can optimize on its terms and thereby maximize 
shareholder and aggregate wealth. As this Article will show, a 
competing governance model with stronger board authority in 
the short term and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer 
term instead emerges as the best means of achieving that end. 
The key to understanding the economic mechanisms un-
derpinning the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff is the 
power to remove managers. By default, this power belongs to 
the board, as the institution charged with supervising man-
agement.12 However, if shareholders are displeased with the 
way directors serve their monitoring function, they retain the 
right to remove both incumbent directors and managers.13 Now, 
under the conventional information account of the shareholder-
manager relationship, the utility of the shareholders’ power of 
removal is that it has an expected cost to incumbents that in-
centivizes them to exert effort and refrain from moral hazard.14  
Shareholder advocates, in particular, defend the need for a 
strong shareholders’ power of removal—exercisable virtually at 
any time—in order to ensure that the exercise of this power (or 
even just the threat of it) can serve an effective disciplinary 
function.15 However, once the problem of adverse selection is 
taken into consideration, this account of the shareholders’ re-
moval power is revealed as incomplete. 
First, the shareholder advocates’ approach stands against 
standard economic assumptions about the use of incentive 
compensation as a helpful means to promote managerial ef-
fort.16 It also runs opposite to the widespread adoption of incen-
 
 12. See, e.g., Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1060–62 (describ-
ing functions and powers of the board of directors). 
 13. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(affirming the shareholders’ right to remove directors if displeased with their 
actions); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994) 
(providing a summary of comparable state corporation code provisions). 
 14. See infra note 51. 
 15. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 16. The standard reference is to Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May–June 1990, at 138, 143–46. 
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tive compensation schemes we observe in the real corporate 
world.17  
Second, that approach fails to incorporate the additional 
information problem of adverse selection, as well as the limits 
of incentive compensation or any other incentive-compatible 
mechanism for mitigating adverse selection.18 Indeed, the use of 
reward mechanisms can induce a manager to exert effort, but 
cannot improve a manager’s skills. For example, they cannot 
induce an untalented manager to act as a talented one. And, in 
any event, using such mechanisms to induce a bad manager to 
“behave”—think of a manager with an excessive taste for pri-
vate benefits, for example—will typically prove too costly to 
shareholders.19 Further, in other contexts, contracting with bad 
types will generally remain profitable to principals as long as 
they can set ad-hoc contractual terms. For example, consider 
the insurance practice of demanding higher insurance premi-
ums from high-risk prospective customers. Conversely, con-
tracting with a bad manager tends to always be unprofitable to 
shareholders, as no viable mechanism can compensate share-
holders for the losses triggered by a bad manager’s hire. 
Viewed through this lens, the shareholder power of remov-
al matters to shareholders primarily as an ex post20 remedy 
against the risk of hiring a bad manager. But the real issue is 
that, at the same time, removal may impair the shareholders’ 
ability to effectively use incentive compensation to promote ef-
fort by good managers. 
This may occur because the shareholder advocates’ as-
sumption that a firm’s stock price can provide guidance for ac-
curate removal decisions weakens to the extent a manager in-
vests in specific long-term projects where there is a lag between 
the time the investment is made and when its value is real-
ized.21 Classic examples of these projects include investments in 
innovation and other intangible “knowledge” assets, such as 
ideas, patents, brands, software, copyrights, and the like. The 
 
 17. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 9, at 1917–19 (discussing the broad adop-
tion of performance-based pay for CEOs). 
 18. Economists speak of incentive compatibility when a mechanism (e.g., 
a contractual or legal arrangement) exists that can make it individually prof-
itable for the agent to take actions that maximize the principal’s wealth. See 
BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 122–24 (2d ed. 2005). 
 19. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 20. In this Article, the term “ex ante” refers to the period of time before 
the hiring of a manager, while “ex post” refers to after the hiring of a manager. 
 21. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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common features of these investments—which have come to 
constitute the bulk of today’s corporate production22—is that, on 
the one hand, information on their value tends to be “soft,” i.e., 
difficult for outsiders to verify and therefore less likely to be ac-
curately reflected in stock prices.23 On the other hand, these in-
vestments typically demand large capital expenditures up front 
and thus decrease near-term earnings, providing “hard” infor-
mation that is easier to incorporate into the firm’s current stock 
price.24 As a result of these transactional features, prices may 
fail to fully capture the implications of a specific long-term in-
vestment until those implications begin to show up in cash 
flows over time, while being largely uninformative in the short-
term. 
Under the possibility of uninformative short-term prices, 
theory predicts that shareholder interests are served by a re-
gime of “time-consistent removal decisions.”25 Under this re-
gime, shareholders would commit to exercise removal only in 
the longer term, when market prices can be expected to more 
accurately reflect information on the fundamental value of 
managerial decisions. In practice, however, when shareholders 
are empowered to exercise removal at any time—as advocated 
by shareholder defenders—they will be unable to credibly 
commit to time-consistent removal decisions for two basic rea-
sons. First, shareholders anticipate that bad managers are sta-
tistically more likely to be associated with a disappointing firm 
outcome (i.e., low earnings). Second, the short-term inability of 
good managers to support communication about the quality of a 
specific long-term investment with hard information increases 
 
 22. See, e.g., Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure 
a “Technological Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99, 103 (2010) (“[T]he in-
novation that has shaped recent economic growth is not an autonomous event 
that falls like manna from heaven. Nor is it a result of R&D and ICT invest-
ments alone. Instead, a surge of new ideas (technological or otherwise) is 
linked to output growth through a complex process of investments in techno-
logical expertise, product design, market development, and organizational ca-
pability. This process affects all sources of growth to one extent or another but 
is most clearly detected in the growing contribution of intangible capital.”). 
 23. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 249–50 
(2006); see also Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency 
When Some Information Is Soft 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Work-
ing Paper No. 380/2013, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2316194. 
 24. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 249; see also Edmans et al., supra note 
23 (noting the difficulty for a company to credibly disclose information about 
intangible assets). 
 25. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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the risk that a bad manager might mimic a good manager. 
Consequently, shareholders will rationally, but inefficiently, re-
spond to the short-term fall in stock price that may accompany 
a specific long-term investment by removing the manager.26 
The costs of this “limited commitment problem”27 affecting 
shareholders are not limited to the expected loss of value 
caused by the mistaken removal of a good manager. Most im-
portantly for the purpose of this discussion, good managers 
struggling to avoid removal can be expected to become likewise 
unresponsive to incentives for optimal project selection and en-
gage in “strategic signaling.” This means that they may develop 
a preference for passing-up valuable long-term projects, which 
they would otherwise choose under the “right” incentive 
scheme, in favor of less profitable short-termist projects that 
are more likely to increase their chances at being perceived by 
the shareholders as a good manager.28 
This analytical framework has crucial positive implications 
for the debate over the optimal allocation of corporate power. 
First, it exposes short-termism as a much more pervasive prob-
lem than recognized by shareholder advocates. Short-termism 
is not just the result of the pressure of some shareholders with 
excessive discounting preferences (e.g., hedge funds).29 It is, in-
stead, the ultimate consequence of asset pricing inefficiencies 
due to adverse selection issues—that is, market imperfections 
that affect all shareholders as a matter of course. 
Second, this framework reframes board protection from 
shareholder pressure as a corrective that “exploits” a board’s 
bias toward retaining incumbent management to address these 
imperfections. This bias stems from the same reasons that 
shareholder advocates argue promote board capture: the “bonds 
of interest, collegiality or affinity” that are likely to develop 
over time between managers and board members.30 While eco-
nomic theory and governance practices reject that these bonds 
might lead to the drastic consequences drawn by shareholder 
 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value 
of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73–74, 114–15 (2016) (introducing 
the limited commitment problem of shareholders). 
 28. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (elaborating on the short-
term incentive problem). 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 92–98. 
 30. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 784 (2002). 
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advocates, it is plausible that they might induce a board to be 
more tolerant than outside investors in evaluating managerial 
performance. In light of this bias, a board that is insulated from 
shareholder discipline—and hence holds exclusive decision-
making power on managerial removal decisions—reduces the 
risk of inefficient removal of good managers and, hence, short-
termism.31  
At the same time, what the defenders of a model with ex-
clusive board authority fail to understand is that board protec-
tion might jeopardize optimal project selection if it becomes 
perpetual, as a board’s bias might grow excessive in the longer 
term. Indeed, the same reasons that make a board less inclined 
to remove a manager in the short term may make the board 
less inclined to remove her in the longer term, even upon the 
observation of a disappointing firm outcome that is more likely 
to accurately signal a bad manager.32 
As a normative matter, this framework indicates that a 
corporate model with strong board authority in the short term 
and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer term is better 
suited to optimize the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff 
and, accordingly, maximize shareholder and firm value. Virtu-
ally exclusive board authority in the short term—such as the 
authority a board is likely to gain through the adoption of de-
fensive measures like staggered boards and poison pills33—
harnesses a board’s bias toward retaining incumbent manage-
ment. This ensures that a board’s bias serves as a commitment 
device against inefficient short-term removal decisions and the 
consequential risk of short-termism. In the longer term, howev-
er, a board’s bias might grow excessive, while prices become 
more likely to provide reliable guidance for the efficient exer-
cise of the shareholders’ removal power.34 Over time, a board’s 
exclusive authority over managerial removal decisions should 
thus be relaxed in favor of greater shareholder authority, 
meaning that the shareholders’ power of removal should not be 
constrained by the adoption of defensive measures or any other 
hurdles. 
However, under the recent rise of empowered shareholders, 
boards of directors have grown increasingly less able to gain 
 
 31. See infra Part IV.B. 
 32. See infra Part IV.C. 
 33. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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protection from short-term shareholder pressure. Mainly, this 
outcome is due to the decreased effectiveness of defensive 
measures, as hedge funds and other activists have gained the 
ability to coerce boards to dismiss these defenses or otherwise 
sneak past them.35 Consistent with this Article’s theoretical 
prediction, recent evidence indicates that the result of these 
transformative changes is that corporate America is moving 
away from long-term value creation and toward short-term 
consumption.36 
To reverse this trend, and at the same time preserve the 
long-term benefits of shareholder empowerment, this Article 
submits that a coordinated private ordering response by U.S. 
boards of directors and institutional investors—who have in-
creasingly voiced concerns about the short-termist effect of 
hedge fund activism in recent times37—would be the most polit-
ically feasible option. Crucial to this response would be to rein-
state the limitations on short-term shareholder interference as 
meaningful high-order constraints. Similar to the function 
served by supermajority requirements designed to protect con-
stitutional constraints, a charter provision requiring superma-
jority approval for the dismissal of defensive measures could 
serve this purpose. At the same time, these limitations should 
have a finite, rather than perpetual, life. To this end, such 
measures should automatically expire as a company transitions 
from the short term to the long term. Further, this Article also 
explores modifications to the Delaware courts’ approach to the 
use of defensive measures that would facilitate the adoption of 
this and other desirable changes to improve corporate govern-
ance in U.S. corporations.38 
 This Article continues as follows. Part I frames the terms 
of debate in which this Article intervenes, reviewing the com-
peting cases for board primacy and shareholder primacy and 
illustrating how recent changes in legal and market practices 
have advanced the case for stronger shareholder rights. Part II 
looks into the debate’s economic stakes, pushing back against 
the claim that managerial moral hazard is the problem in the 
shareholder-manager relationship and showing that moral 
hazard coexists with the additional information problem of ad-
verse selection. Part III discusses the positive implications aris-
 
 35. See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 185, 209–13. 
 38. See infra Part V.B. 
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ing from these competing information problems, demonstrating 
that their coexistence exposes shareholders to a broader gov-
ernance tradeoff than conventionally understood. Part IV ex-
plores the normative implications of the moral hazard-adverse 
selection tradeoff, concluding that a governance model with ex-
clusive board authority in the short term and enhanced share-
holder rights in the longer term emerges as better positioned to 
facilitate this tradeoff than either the traditional board-centric 
model or the shareholder primacy model. Part V discusses the 
policy implications that this Article’s novel theory of board and 
shareholder power bears in light of the recent rise of empow-
ered shareholders. Lastly, the Appendix provides a numerical 
example to add concreteness to this Article’s claims. 
I.  WHITHER CORPORATE MODEL?   
This Part lays out the basic terms of the debate on the op-
timal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. It 
begins, in Section A, by reviewing the contrasting economic ar-
guments in favor of board primacy and shareholder primacy. 
Section B then illustrates how recent changes in legal and 
market practices have contributed to advancing the case for 
shareholder primacy. 
A. BOARD PRIMACY AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
According to the canonical view of corporate governance, 
the risk of managerial moral hazard explains why the corporate 
form presumes the adoption of a board structure alongside cen-
tralized management.39 Day-to-day business decisions are dele-
 
 39. This Article uses the term “board advocates” to identify a school of 
thought that defends the centrality of the board of directors as an institutional 
remedy to the managerial moral hazard problem. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550, 559–74 (2003); William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
653, 658–61 (2010); Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate 
Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657–61 (2011); Martin 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130–31 
(1979); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1759, 1777 (2006). Excluded from this group of scholars are two prom-
inent voices defending board primacy—Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. Blair 
and Stout challenge the principal-agent model of the firm and suggest that a 
“team-production model” capturing the role of other corporate stakeholders is 
descriptively more accurate. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 249. Blair and 
Stout also challenge the view that corporate law’s goal is to maximize share-
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gated to managers, as “agents with valuable relevant 
knowledge”40 that dispersed shareholders tend to lack. This 
separation of ownership and control efficiently allows share-
holders to specialize in risk bearing,41 facilitating the aggrega-
tion of large capital pools.42 However, it also creates the risk 
that managers may opportunistically abuse their business deci-
sion-making power, taking “hidden actions” in their own self-
interest and at the expense of shareholders. In response to this 
risk, corporate law grants ultimate control over the corporate 
affairs to the board of directors,43 as the institution charged 
with ratifying and monitoring management decisions.44 To this 
end, among others, board members have the power of selecting 
the CEO and top executives, setting executive compensation 
arrangements, deciding on the removal of management, and 
taking major corporate decisions.45 
For board advocates, collective action problems and asym-
metric information provide the key economic arguments for 
privileging this allocation of corporate powers. Unlike share-
holders—these advocates argue—the board of directors can act 
as an efficient central decision-maker within the corporation, 
avoiding issues of rational apathy and enjoying privileged ac-
cess to corporate information.46 The need to protect the board’s 
informational advantage from the interference of less-informed 
 
holder value. See id. at 253. Conversely, this Article still embraces shareholder 
value maximization and the principal-agent model of the firm, but criticizes 
the standard corporate law approach to that model as incomplete insofar as it 
fails to consider the additional information problem of adverse selection. 
 40. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308 (1983). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991). 
 43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 44. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 306 (1985) (“The 
board of directors thus arises endogenously, as a means by which to safeguard 
the investments of those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropria-
tion because the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined and cannot be 
protected in a well-focused, transaction-specific way.”); Benjamin E. Hermalin 
& Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined 
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. 
POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7, 9. 
 45. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1060–62. 
 46. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 550; Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 39, at 659–60. 
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shareholders also explains why the traditional corporate model 
vests shareholders with only a limited capacity to intervene in 
corporate affairs.47 At the same time, according to board advo-
cates, this model performs an efficient balancing act between 
board authority and accountability. It does so by granting 
shareholders the right to appoint directors (and vote on their 
tenure at periodic elections)48 and the benefit of fiduciary du-
ties.49 Further, this model also grants shareholders the power 
to remove board members and their appointed officials, the 
managers—either through a proxy contest50 or by selling their 
shares to an outside bidder in the context of a hostile takeo-
ver.51 The power of removal—or even just the threat of it—
provides shareholders obvious utility, as its expected cost to in-
cumbents incentivizes greater effort.52 
 
 47. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance 
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless 
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–
4 (2010). Aside from the exercise of veto rights over some fundamental corpo-
rate transactions, shareholders lack the right to direct the management of the 
corporation. See generally Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
183 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW] (describing 
the traditional governance rights of shareholders).  
 48. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 357–400 (1986) 
(providing a general discussion of shareholders’ voting rights). 
 49. While Delaware courts have sometimes articulated the requirement of 
fiduciary duty as being owed to the corporation, the operation of this require-
ment has consistently identified the interests of the shareholders as proxy for 
the interest of the corporation. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of 
Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 52–58 (2004). 
 50. Ordinarily removal rights follow appointment rights. See Luca 
Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders 
as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 47, at 55, 60 
(“Indeed, one might say that directors are normally ‘removed’ by dropping 
their names from the company’s slate or by failing to reelect them.”) But 
shareholders are also granted the extraordinary power to remove directors be-
fore the end of their terms. In particular, Delaware treats the shareholders’ 
power to remove directors without cause as a statutory default subject to re-
versal, unless a board is staggered (in which case removal needs to be for 
cause). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2001). 
 51. See John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 47, at 35, 41 (describing this kind of 
removal as a “right of transfer” belonging to the shareholders). 
 52. See id. (discussing the disciplinary function of the exercise of removal 
power through the sale of shares in the context of a takeover transaction); Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
676–77, 680–82 (2007) (discussing the disciplinary function of the shareholder 
franchise). 
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In stark contrast, shareholder advocates argue that share-
holders lack effective remedies to hold directors accountable, 
challenging the board’s ability to serve as a faithful guardian of 
shareholder interests.53 According to these scholars, fiduciary 
rules provide weak deterrence against moral hazard, as such 
rules are of uncertain application, are excessively costly to en-
force, and are too vague.54 Most importantly, they argue the 
shareholders’ power of removal is “largely a myth” as a result of 
“managerial entrenchment” and “board capture.”55 
Entrenchment arises when directors and managers gain 
protection from the threat of removal through the adoption of 
defensive measures that make it difficult for shareholders to 
replace incumbents.56 Classic examples of such measures in-
clude poison pills and staggered boards. A poison pill, also 
called a shareholders’ rights plan, is a defensive measure that 
so dilutes a bidder’s economic rights that the only way to com-
plete a takeover is to first appoint a new majority of directors 
who can remove it.57 When a board is staggered, however, a 
bidder’s ability to do so is substantially reduced.58 This is be-
cause in a staggered board directors are commonly grouped into 
three different classes and each class stands for reelection in 
successive years. Hence, a prospective bidder needs to endure 
the costly delay of waiting through two election cycles before 
 
 53. Notably, the leading voice among shareholder advocates is Harvard 
Law School’s Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851–75 (2005) (advocat-
ing for the expansion of shareholder governance rights as a remedy against 
the ineffectiveness of board monitoring); Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 694–711 
(advocating for a reform of corporate elections so as to make directors more 
accountable to shareholders). 
 54. See Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Con-
tracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 141–42 (providing a summary of the standard ar-
guments articulated against the effectiveness of fiduciary duties). 
 55. Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 732. 
 56. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Govern-
ance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788 (2009). 
 57. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights that are granted to ex-
isting shareholders in the event a corporate raider accumulates more than a 
certain threshold of outstanding stock, and which entitle the existing share-
holders (but not the raider) to acquire newly issued stock at a substantial dis-
count from the market price. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share 
Purchase Rights Plans, in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW 
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 3, 4–12 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (set-
ting forth terms of a standard poison pill). 
 58. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893, 
907 (2002). 
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being able to replace a majority of the board. Further, en-
trenchment is also favored by incumbents’ exclusive access to 
the corporation’s proxy machinery, which shareholder advo-
cates argue raises prohibitive procedural costs for prospective 
challengers.59 
Because entrenchment weakens the disciplining effect of 
removal, shareholder advocates claim it allows top executives 
to capture the board, making directors subservient to manage-
ment or simply ineffective at fulfilling their monitoring func-
tion.60 For theses advocates, the clearest evidence of board cap-
ture would is the ability of executives to extract “pay-without-
performance”61: high-powered compensation schemes that pay 
executives more than “the minimum expected monetary payoff 
to be left [to agents] to preserve incentives”62 (i.e., what econo-
mists call “information rents”).63 This approach stands in clear 
contrast with the conventional economic account of incentive 
compensation as the most effective way to reign in managerial 
moral hazard.64 Indeed, shareholder advocates remain skeptical 
that incentive-compatible compensation arrangements65 can be 
designed in practice. In their view, board capture negates an 
essential premise of incentive compatibility: that principals can 
take an adversarial position against agents.66 
In response to these inefficiencies, shareholder advocates 
demand to strengthen the governance powers of shareholders—
in particular, the power of promptly removing directors and 
managers.67 Only by ensuring that shareholders enjoy a power 
 
 59. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 688–91. 
 60. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 30, at 754, 783–86. 
 61. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 8, 61–79, 80–82 
(2004). 
 62. TIROLE, supra note 23, at 117. 
 63. See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 3, at 29. 
 64. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
 65. See SALANIÉ, supra note 18 (providing a definition of incentive com-
patibility). 
 66. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 30. 
 67. See Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 677. Among other proposals, share-
holder advocates have called for the adoption of majority voting, the “right to 
replace all incumbents every two or three years,” the right to expanded “access 
to the proxy statement” and the “reimbursement of solicitation expenses,” the 
“access to management’s proxy statements,” and the “power to trump contrary 
board-adopted bylaws” and adopt “shareholder-initiated charter amendments.” 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 671–73 (providing a summary descrip-
tion of these proposals). 
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of removal unencumbered by the adoption of defensive 
measures (or hurdles affecting the proxy process)—they ar-
gue—can shareholders’ control over the corporation have teeth 
and corporate governance be placed on new solid foundations.68 
Economically, this argument rests on Jensen and Meckling’s 
classical principal-agent framing of corporate relationships.69 
That framing recasts shareholders as principals—residual 
claimants that have the best incentives to constrain managerial 
moral hazard and maximize firm value, unlike potentially cap-
tured boards.70  
Furthermore, shareholder advocates maintain that the ef-
ficiency of stock prices largely mitigates any alleged coordina-
tion and information problems that could prevent shareholders 
from exercising corporate control effectively. In contrast with 
what is argued by board advocates, stock prices could be relied 
upon to reliably convey information on the value implications of 
managerial and directorial decisions.71 Additionally, as dis-
cussed in the following Section, the emergence of a new class of 
sophisticated investors and recent regulatory developments 
would have further reduced the informational gaps between 
boards and shareholders and, therefore, enhanced the ability of 
shareholders to effectively provide value-increasing governance 
inputs. 
B. THE RISE OF EMPOWERED SHAREHOLDERS 
Shareholder advocates have been engaged in a battle to re-
form the traditional board-centric model of the corporation for 
over three decades, since the late 1970s. For most of this time, 
this battle has favored directors and managers. Since the early 
2000s, however, the balance of corporate power has shifted ra-
ther dramatically as a result of several changes occurring in 
both regulation and market practices that have promoted 
shareholder empowerment.  
 
 68. See Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 732. 
 69. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 308–10 (1976). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). The theoretical underpinning 
here is the semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH), under which market prices accurately reflect all available public in-
formation on firm outcomes. See id. 
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Of all these changes, perhaps the most salient has been the 
rise of activist hedge funds.72 Unlike the dispersed investors 
stereotyped by Berle and Means or the largely defendant insti-
tutional investors of yesteryear,73 activist hedge funds routinely 
rely on the proactive use of governance levers in order to pur-
sue near or intermediate term investment objectives.74 In doing 
so, they have drawn heavily on the moral hazard-reductive 
playbook of shareholder advocates, seeking increased leverage, 
pressing for the return of excess cash to shareholders, forcing 
the sale of non-core corporate assets, and engaging in cost-
cutting initiatives.75 On top of all this—again, consistent with 
the shareholder advocates’ demand for strengthening share-
holders’ removal power—the funds have often sought the re-
placement of incumbent CEOs and other top executives.76 
Most frequently, hedge funds have pushed for these chang-
es by launching proxy fights or threatening to do so,77 typically 
seeking, and often gaining, the support of institutional inves-
tors.78 The activists’ newly founded ability to use proxy fights 
 
 72. In the period 2010–15, one out of two S&P 500 companies had an ac-
tivist fund on its share register and one out of seven received an activist at-
tack. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www 
.economist.com/news/leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good 
-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes. In 2014 alone, activists launched 
344 campaigns against U.S. public companies (up from 291 in 2013). Taking 
Care of Business: A Look at Shareholder Activism in 2014 and Beyond, ACTIV-
IST INSIGHT ACTIVIST INVESTING REV., 2015, at 8. 
 73. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future 
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56–58 (2011) 
(drawing a distinction between the “defensive” activism of institutional inves-
tors, directed at taking actions to protect existing investments, and the “offen-
sive” activism of hedge funds, directed at seeking targets to fit their agenda for 
activism). 
 74. The high-powered compensation structure of hedge fund managers, 
the concentration of the funds’ investments in just a few targeted companies, 
greater regulatory freedom, and smaller exposure to liquidity shocks are the 
primary factors explaining why activism is a rational profit-making strategy 
for these corporate actors. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds 
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 
1064–66, 1069–70 (2007). 
 75. E.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 683; Alon Brav et al., 
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1741–45 (2008) (describing the five major categories of hedge funds’ 
stated objectives). 
 76. See Brav et al., supra note 75, at 1743–45 (detailing the tendency and 
success rates of such hostile tactics). 
 77. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403–05 (2007) (providing a sample of proxy contests). 
 78. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
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effectively was made possible by the “modernization” process of 
proxy rules, which the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) began in the 1990s.79 This process has made it considera-
bly easier and cheaper for insurgents to engage in a proxy con-
test. Activists have also significantly gained by the switch to 
majority voting, which has come to replace plurality voting at 
most public companies.80 Under majority voting, only nominees 
who receive a majority of the votes cast are elected to the 
board. As a result, vote withholding (or “just say no”) cam-
paigns have acquired direct legal significance today, since 
shareholders can effectively use these campaigns to throw in-
cumbents out of office without having to file a proxy statement 
with the SEC.81 
Besides hedge funds, proxy advisory firms are the other 
new corporate governance player that has largely contributed 
to the empowerment of shareholders. These firms today play a 
major role in influencing corporate governance policies at many 
U.S. corporations, as they provide most institutional investors 
with voting recommendations on any matter on which share-
holders vote.82 In providing these services, proxy advisors 
strongly support the proposition that “enhanced shareholder 
 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013). 
 79. See generally Thomas Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New 
Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 686–94 
(2007) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the changes in proxy rules 
that facilitated hedge fund activism). 
 80. Stephen Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountabil-
ity?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2016) (“Over the last decade, the move 
from plurality to majority voting for corporate directors has been one of the 
most popular and successful corporate governance reform efforts.”). 
 81. Withhold (or “just say no”) campaigns involve the withholding of votes 
on specific governance issues, such as the election of directors. Before the 
adoption of majority voting, withhold campaigns could at best cause embar-
rassment to director nominees. Under majority voting, they have become po-
tent weapons to defeat incumbent directors. See Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1020–21 (2010) (discussing the 
passage from plurality to majority voting). 
 82. See generally K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and En-
trenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 746 (2016) (“In-
stitutional Shareholder Services (ISS) alone, the largest proxy advisory firm, 
claims to advise over 1,600 clients, who manage over $25 trillion in assets.” 
(citing Robert D. Hershey, A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at B6)); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance In-
dustry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 898–906 (2007) (discussing six of such advisory 
firms). 
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rights are consistent with best governance practices.”83 At the 
same time, they oppose the adoption of defensive arrangements 
as inconsistent with such practices. 
As a result of these developments84—especially activists’ 
newly founded ability to remove incumbents at virtually any 
time—shareholders are today increasingly able to influence 
both governance practices and investment policies. Meanwhile, 
board power has been correspondingly eroded. The most telling 
evidence of this shift in the balance of corporate power is the 
changes that occurred in the use of defensive measures. While 
directors theoretically have a veto power over destaggering de-
cisions,85 in recent years they have increasingly acquiesced to 
destaggering proposals86 under the pressure exerted by both 
proxy advisors87 and activist shareholders.88 The use of the poi-
 
 83. Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 746–47. 
 84. Other significant changes that have contributed to empowering 
shareholders include: amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
that have granted shareholders greater access to the ballot box, the introduc-
tion of say-on-pay shareholder votes, and a further expansion of the scope of 
shareholder proposals to effect changes in corporate election procedures. Id. at 
799–800. 
 85. This is so as long as the staggered board is established in the charter, 
in which case destaggering involves the coordinated action of the board and 
the shareholders, as charter amendments can be initiated only by the board 
and require shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) 
(2017); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Conversely, 
shareholders can unilaterally dismiss a staggered board established in the by-
laws, as board initiative is not required for bylaw amendments. See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2017); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a)–(b) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2010). Most staggered boards, however, are established in the char-
ter. Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 94 n.140. 
 86. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 98–99 (documenting that lower 
staggered board levels over time are largely due to increased destaggering ra-
ther than a fall in staggering events). 
 87. The recommendation that companies should have a unitary board, or 
else shareholders should seek a destaggering proposal, figures among the most 
important voting guidelines that proxy advisors routinely provide to investors. 
See, e.g., INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDE-
LINES 10 (2013), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2014ISSUSSummary 
Guidelines.pdf. 
 88. Activist shareholders have increasingly resorted to precatory pro-
posals and the threat of vote-withholding campaigns to pursue board 
destaggering at several companies, and with growing success. The Harvard 
Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) alone, a clinical program established at 
Harvard Law School to assist institutional investors in the submission of 
precatory proposals to destagger the board, has “contributed to board 
[destaggering] at about 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies” in just three 
years. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2017). 
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son pill has similarly declined—again, largely as a result of the 
war waged against it by proxy advisors and activist investors.89 
Further, poison pills also seem to have grown less effective in 
circumstances involving an activist attack. This has occurred in 
part because the support of institutional shareholders has ena-
bled hedge funds to wage victorious proxy contests with stakes 
that remain below common pill-triggering thresholds, in part 
because the funds’ bargaining levers have proved increasingly 
successful in coercing boards to remove the pill “willingly.”90 
II.  ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE SHAREHOLDER-
MANAGER RELATIONSHIP   
Unsurprisingly, the rise of empowered shareholders has re-
ignited the debate about the optimal balance of corporate pow-
ers. For board advocates, this development makes the current 
case for shielding boards from shareholder and market pres-
sure more compelling than ever. In contrast, shareholder advo-
cates view activist shareholders—and, in particular, hedge 
funds—as the natural champions of the long-dormant share-
holder franchise. Yet, despite these opposing views about the 
respective role of boards and shareholders, both board advo-
cates and shareholder advocates share a common predisposi-
tion to regard managerial moral hazard as the problem to be 
addressed in corporate law. 
Economic theory, however, has long shown that the most 
pervasive information problem is “adverse selection”: as put by 
Nobel Laureate in economics George Akerlof, “the difficulty of 
distinguishing good quality from bad.”91 In the corporate con-
text, this difficulty translates into the inability of shareholders 
to separate “good” managers, whose incentives to act opportun-
 
 89. Stephen M. Gill et al., Structural Defenses to Shareholder Activism, 47 
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 151, 170 n.162 (2014) (“Whereas 57% of the 
S&P 500 companies had poison pills at the end of 2003, only 7% had pills in 
place at the end of 2013.” (citation omitted)). 
 90. The recent battle fought for the control of the board of Sotheby’s is 
emblematic. After having adopted a pill in the attempt to defeat the attack of 
activist investor Third Point, the board decided to “willingly” remove it. Signif-
icantly, this decision took place after the board had obtained a favorable 
judgment by the Delaware Chancery Court that the use of a two-tier pill (i.e., 
a pill providing for different triggering thresholds for activist and non-activist 
investors) was not “preclusive.” See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A., No. 
9469–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *2, *14, *19 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014). 
 91. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970). 
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istically and deviate from optimal project selection, can be re-
dressed through reward mechanisms, from “bad” ones, who do 
not respond to such reward mechanisms. 
The matter is not just about academic rigor, but rather in-
volves two critical descriptive points, which bear crucial norma-
tive implications. This Part takes up the first point, showing 
that adverse selection issues matters as much as issues of mor-
al hazard in the shareholder-manager relationship. The second 
point is addressed in Part III, where this Article shows that a 
more complex corporate governance tradeoff emerges once the 
information problems arising from the separation of ownership 
and control are considered in full. Corporate law’s fundamental 
optimization problem is not simply how to incentivize manage-
rial effort despite shareholders being unable to observe the ac-
tions a manager takes. Rather it is how to do so when share-
holders do not know whether they are dealing with a good or 
bad manager, and when attempts at getting rid of bad manag-
ers can introduce distortions on the moral hazard front. 
A. REASSESSING THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF POWER DEBATE 
As highlighted in the Introduction, board advocates view 
the rise of empowered shareholders as harming U.S. corpora-
tions. Empowered shareholders, they argue, both jeopardize the 
board’s informational advantage and exacerbate issues of short-
termism.92 In the standard rendering, short-termism results 
from the risk that “impatient” shareholders with near-term li-
quidity needs might pressure companies to undertake invest-
ments “that are profitable in the short term but value-
decreasing in the long term.”93 Classic examples include cutting 
specific investments that would pay off later on or undertaking 
projects that deliver cash on the nails at the expense of long-
term profitability. Further, board advocates reject the claim of 
market price robustness, asserting that market prices provide 
at best an imperfect informational focal point for the exercise of 
shareholder governance.94 
 
 92. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves 
Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1639–40, 1651 (2013); see also id. 
at 1639 nn.2–6, 1640 nn.7–11 (collecting the most important contributions ex-
pressing short-termism concerns). 
 93. Id. at 1638. 
 94. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 696 (“Information 
asymmetries make it difficult for the market to project accurately . . . .”). 
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To these criticisms, shareholder advocates respond that, 
first, short-termist concerns have marginal relevance relative 
to the much more pervasive problem of managerial moral haz-
ard.95 
Indeed, some shareholders—hedge funds, in the first 
place96—may plausibly have liquidity needs that induce them to 
undertake lucrative short-term investments at the expense of 
long-term firm results.97 But this kind of behavior cannot rea-
sonably be presumed to constitute a systemic shareholder is-
sue.98 Conversely, managerial moral hazard is a problem affect-
ing all shareholders. 
Second, shareholder advocates argue that portraying to-
day’s shareholders as necessarily less informed than board 
members fails to take into account both investors’ increased so-
phistication and the changes that have occurred in board com-
position. Activist investors such as hedge funds possess both 
the incentives and the resources to act as “governance entre-
preneurs” that specialize in monitoring and providing govern-
ance and strategic inputs.99 Along the same lines, institutional 
shareholders can rely on proxy advisory firms, which increas-
ingly act as “central coordinating and information agents,”100 to 
gather information regarding governance at particular firms. 
Accordingly, one could no longer assume that hedge funds and 
institutional investors necessarily stand at an informational 
disadvantage relative to independent directors, who have come 
to occupy the largest fraction of seats in most U.S. boards.101 
 
 95. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 92, at 1651 (rejecting the view that de-
picts “the long-term costs of shareholder power and activism as large and the 
threats posed by them as grave”); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism: In 
the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1004 (2012) (arguing 
that short-termism “is insufficiently strong, empirically and theoretically, to 
affect corporate rulemaking”). 
 96. Kahan & Rock, supra note 74, at 1083 (“Hedge funds come close to be-
ing the archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a 
full day represents a ‘long-term’ investment.”). 
 97. The empirical evidence on the long-term effect of hedge fund activism 
is mixed; most recent empirical studies seem to support the view that hedge 
fund activism is detrimental in the longer term. For a recent review, see 
Martijn Cremers et al., Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation, 94 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 16–21 (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
 98. See Roe, supra note 95, at 980, 1005. 
 99. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 78, at 897. 
 100. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1007. 
 101. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in 
the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
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Unlike executive directors, independent directors typically have 
full-time jobs elsewhere and can therefore devote relatively lit-
tle time to their board functions.102 Further, they also tend to 
have little firm-specific knowledge or skills, as the emphasis 
placed on independence requirements in current rules govern-
ing the board appointment process has sacrificed expertise re-
quirements.103 
These arguments fairly project today’s shareholders as well 
positioned to exercise corporate control. Under this projection, 
the case for preferring shareholder primacy to board primacy is 
considerably strengthened. If enhanced principal control can 
reduce the expected cost of managerial moral hazard and 
shareholders are now in the position to exercise principal con-
trol effectively, then one must conclude that enhancing share-
holder power increases firm value. This argument is as 
straightforward as it could be. But therein lies the problem. For 
the shareholder advocates’ argument rests on a crucial over-
simplifying assumption about the information structure of the 
shareholder-manager relationship: that shareholders are im-
mune to the additional, and fundamental, information problem 
of adverse selection.104 
As with moral hazard, conflicting objectives and asymmet-
ric information are the basic ingredients of adverse selection. In 
the case of adverse selection, however, the agent’s private in-
formation involves “hidden knowledge” about her characteris-
tics or the execution of the delegated task. Collectively, in the 
jargon of economists, this is known as the agent’s “type.”105 In 
particular, in the corporate context, a manager will tend to 
have exclusive information on both her ability to run a business 
and the actual conditions of that business. A manager’s skills in 
running different investment projects, the amount of effort the-
se projects require, their intrinsic quality, or the room such pro-
jects offer for private benefits extraction all provide illustra-
tions of the hidden knowledge managers are likely to have on 
 
 102. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1061. 
 103. See id. at 1066. 
 104. The 2001 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was shared by three econ-
omists who did the most to call attention to the inefficiencies created by ad-
verse selection—George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz. Press 
Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 (Oct. 10, 2001), http://www 
.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/press.html. 
 105. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 491 (introducing the classic treatment of 
adverse selection in the product market, i.e., between buyers and sellers). 
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both her skills and a business condition. Because of this infor-
mation asymmetry, “bad” managerial types might be able to 
mimic “good” types, to the detriment of shareholders. 
While challenging the desirability of shareholder primacy, 
board advocates similarly ignore the adverse selection issues 
that arise in the shareholder-manager relationship. In fact, dis-
cussions of adverse selection in the existing corporate law 
scholarship have largely been constrained to investor protec-
tion in capital markets. Put simply, adverse selection has been 
described as an issue affecting the quality of publicly traded se-
curities, with the difficulty lying in screening out low-quality 
issuers.106 Virtually no attention,107 instead, has been paid to 
the effects of adverse selection on managerial incentives—that 
is, to adverse selection issues arising within the boundaries of 
the firm. The ensuing discussion endeavors to fill this gap in 
the literature, showing that issues of adverse selection cannot 
be assumed away from the shareholder-manager relationship, 
as shareholders lack the means to separate good managers 
from bad ones. 
B. HIDDEN ACTIONS AND HIDDEN KNOWLEDGE 
In order to better understand why an analytical framework 
that only incorporates the problem of managerial moral hazard 
has limited explanatory reach, it is helpful to begin by briefly 
reviewing the differences between moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues as stylized in formal economic models. 
In moral hazard models,108 the principal cannot observe 
what action an agent ultimately will take, but is assumed to 
anticipate perfectly: (i) the agent’s type; (ii) the agent’s availa-
ble actions (which are essentially determined by the agent’s 
type); (iii) the payoff associated with the agent’s actions (which 
also is a function of the type); (iv) the mapping between the 
agent’s effort and performance; and (v) the agent’s payoff func-
 
 106. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 51, at 40. 
 107. Two substantial exceptions include Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Ineffi-
cient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991) (providing a seminal 
treatment of adverse selection in the corporate context, although focusing on 
the creditor-firm relationship rather than the shareholder-manager relation-
ship), and Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic 
Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277 (1998) 
(employing an adverse selection model to examine the economics of the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine). 
 108. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115. 
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tion and how it varies depending on available actions.109 As ap-
plied to the corporate context, these assumptions imply that 
the shareholders will, for example, know whether a manager 
has sufficient industry expertise, what kind of projects she has 
available, what cash flows these projects are expected to deliver 
and how their distribution changes depending on the level of 
managerial effort, and, finally, how the manager’s payoff func-
tion changes depending on the available projects and the 
amount of effort each project requires. 
On the contrary, in adverse selection models, the principal 
lacks knowledge about the agent’s specific characteristics or the 
execution of the delegated task. In this context, the principal 
only anticipates: (i) the general characteristics of agent types, 
such as the different skills exhibited by good and bad manag-
ers; (ii) the distribution of types, such as the percentage of good 
and bad managers in the market; and (iii) the payoffs associat-
ed with each type (which are assumed to be a function of the 
type), such as the cash flows that the hire of a good or bad 
manager is expected to deliver.110 
Under these different information constraints, principals 
bear different information costs. In general terms, moral haz-
ard costs arise because the principal faces the problem of induc-
ing effort by the agent, despite being unable to condition the 
agent’s payoff on the actions the agent takes. Under adverse se-
lection, instead, the problem for the principal is to induce the 
agent to reveal her hidden knowledge, so that the principal can 
separate good and bad types and reward (or punish) them ac-
cordingly. 
For ease of tractability, formal models of moral hazard and 
adverse selections tend to separately focus on each of these 
problems. In actuality, however, principals—including share-
holders—can be presumed to simultaneously face both issues of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. A stylized illustration is 
helpful to better clarify this point as well as to add concreteness 
to the differences between moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems.111 Consider a company—specifically, an information 
 
 109. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. 
ECON. 74, 75–76 (1979) (modeling the principal’s monetary payoff as a func-
tion of both the agent’s unobservable actions, i.e., effort, and a random state of 
nature, with the expected realization of the principal’s monetary payoff in-
creasing in the agent’s effort level). 
 110. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 489–99. 
 111. The illustration introduced in this Section provides the basic setting 
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technology manufacturer—which needs to hire a manager to 
run its business. As standard in principal-agent models, let us 
represent the shareholders as principals and the manager as 
agent.112 While this representation simplifies the internal or-
ganization of the public corporation, it causes no loss of gener-
ality for the purpose of the present discussion. Consistent with 
standard assumptions in adverse selection models, let us also 
assume that the shareholders know that “Good Managers” rep-
resent 80% of the overall managerial population, while “Bad 
Managers” represent the remaining 20%. This assumption is 
also realistic in the context of a developed capital market, such 
as the U.S. market, where adverse selection can be presumed to 
be relatively mild. 
Only three kinds of projects are available to the company—
“Regular,” “Innovative,” and “Bad” projects—and the company’s 
business only lasts two periods—identified as the short term 
and the long term, at the end of which the company is liquidat-
ed.113 In reality, of course, a company will have many more 
available projects to choose from, which will also tend to devel-
op along multiple periods (i.e., years). Nevertheless, these fur-
ther assumptions cause, again, no loss of generality for the 
purpose of this discussion. 
The Regular Project involves the production of an updated 
version of a computer that the company has now produced and 
marketed for some time. The Innovative Project, instead, in-
volves the production of a new, advanced-technology computer 
and, as such, requires the exercise of greater managerial effort. 
For example, the Innovative Project might demand the manag-
er to work longer hours, or require her to make some unpopular 
decisions, such as cutting corporate perks to fund the develop-
ment of the more advanced technology, or firing several compa-
ny engineers in order to hire a new, more talented team that 
has greater chances to succeed in developing the new technolo-
gy.  
 
for an example that is used throughout this Article’s discussion, and presented 
in an expanded version in the Appendix. 
 112. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115. 
 113. As a reference point to identify these periods with more concreteness, 
note that the average tenure of U.S. CEOs is around seven years. See Steven 
N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) (documenting that, from 1992 to 2007, for a sam-
ple of large U.S. companies, the average CEO turnover was about seven 
years). 
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Because choosing the Regular Project over the Innovative 
Project allows the manager to save the cost of exercising great-
er effort, the Regular Project can be described as delivering the 
manager a private benefit or, put differently, as providing a 
stylized representation of managerial moral hazard.114 From the 
shareholders’ perspective, however, while being more uncer-
tain, the Innovative Project is more desirable than the Regular 
Project. Indeed, while the development of a new computer is 
likely to involve higher up-front costs as well as greater poten-
tial difficulties and delays, if successful, it is also likely to give 
the company a significant advantage over competitors in the 
longer term. On the contrary, while being more likely to gener-
ate returns in the short term, a computer that the company has 
produced for some time can be expected to become outdated in 
the longer term. 
Unlike the Regular Project, the Bad Project involves the 
pursuing of an obsolete technology that the manager has an in-
terest in keeping in place because of some hidden knowledge, 
rather than because she can exert hidden actions that allow her 
to save the cost of effort. For example, the manager may lack 
the talent to undertake a better project, or she may have per-
sonally invested in the project and stubbornly think—either be-
cause of hubris,115 excessive optimism116 or specific risk prefer-
ences117—that the project has better prospects than it does in 
actuality or, still, that abandoning such a project might be in-
terpreted as an admission of failure on her part.118 Additional 
 
 114. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115. 
 115. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. 
BUS. 197, 197 (1986) (arguing that managerial “hubris” may result in overin-
vestment). 
 116. See generally Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfi-
dence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661 (2005) (focusing on the 
distortions arising from managerial “overconfidence”). 
 117. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and 
Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 
(1969) (discussing the risk-averse implications that may arise out of “the man-
agerial tendency to identify with the enterprise and the desire for security”); 
Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital 
Management, 101 Q.J. ECON. 835, 836–38 (1986) (demonstrating formally that 
career concerns may induce a general reluctance on the part of managers to 
undertake new investment projects). 
 118. See Arnoud W.A. Boot, Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and 
Takeovers, 47 J. FIN. 1401, 1408–09 (1992) (showing that managers may be 
reluctant to either liquidate or divest poorly performing lines of business, for 
fear that such actions will be interpreted as an admission of failure on their 
part). For more concrete illustrations of bad projects falling along these lines, 
  
2017] BOARD AND SHAREHOLDER POWER 1403 
 
illustrations of hidden managerial knowledge that may explain 
the undertaking of a Bad Project may involve the manager’s 
ability to extract forms of private benefits that go beyond sav-
ing the cost of effort. For example, the Bad Project may involve 
a supplier with whom the manager has a preexisting personal 
relationship that would be jeopardized if the manager chose 
another project or may grant the manager exclusive opportuni-
ties for personal networking. Of course, from the shareholders’ 
perspective the Bad Project is the least desirable as pursuing 
an obsolete technology may arguably be assumed to be less 
profitable than the restyling of a current computer or the pro-
duction of an innovative one. 
These stylized representations of the possible projects 
available to the manager more tangibly capture the difference 
between the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Indeed, a manager will be Bad—and hence pose an adverse se-
lection problem—when her specific skills, preferences or the 
conditions of the business in which she operates constrain her 
to the choice of a Bad Project. On the contrary, a manager will 
be Good but rationally opportunistic—and hence pose a moral 
hazard problem—when her specific skills, preferences or the 
conditions of the business in which she operates119 exclude that 
she may undertake a Bad Project, but still leave open the pos-
sibility that she may choose the Regular Project over the Inno-
vative Project. Further, the illustration also helps to better see 
the implications of the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues in the shareholder-manager relationship. Be-
cause information asymmetry makes shareholders unable to 
verify both the actions managers take and their types, they are 
exposed both to the risk of hiring a Good Manager who will un-
 
see Isabelle Royer, Why Bad Projects Are So Hard To Kill, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Feb. 2003), https://hbr.org/2003/02/why-bad-projects-are-so-hard-to-kill. 
 119. For simplicity, as standard in adverse selection models, the example 
in the text assumes that the quality of the project available to a manager de-
pends on her type. This assumption, however, is not strictly necessary to styl-
ize adverse selection in the shareholder-manager relationship, as a manager 
may—and often will—acquire private information on the quality of available 
projects over the course of her employment. See Talley, supra note 107, at 281. 
Accordingly, there are two ways of interpreting the example’s setting. One can 
either imagine, as noted in the text, that the described setting captures the 
adverse selection issues that arise when the manager is hired, posing that the 
manager’s expertise gives her access to prospectively superior information 
about the business. Alternatively, one can imagine a situation in which the 
issue is the review of managerial compensation, in which case the manager 
will have more direct private information on the business conditions. 
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dertake the Regular Project rather than the Innovative Project 
and that of hiring a Bad Manager, who will undertake the Bad 
Project. 
C. ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ASSUMING AWAY ADVERSE 
SELECTION 
The above discussion helps to better grasp the implications 
of assuming away adverse selection issues from the sharehold-
er-manager relationship, as commonly done both by sharehold-
er advocates and board advocates. Doing so is equivalent to as-
suming the existence of incentive-compatible mechanisms that 
make it profitable to a manager to disclose information about 
her type. 
As hinted to above, in the case of moral hazard, the stand-
ard incentive-compatible mechanism to incentivize effort is to 
anchor managerial compensation to observable firm out-
comes.120 Although challenged by shareholder advocates, the ra-
tionale behind incentive compensation schemes is that the cost 
to a manager of exerting effort is outweighed by the expected 
reward she receives for improved performance, which makes 
the exercise of effort individually efficient for the manager.  
Along the same lines, in the case of adverse selection, a 
contract is deemed to be incentive compatible when it makes it 
in the agent’s interest to truthfully reveal her information, pre-
venting bad types from mimicking good types.121 A solution to 
this end is offering the agent a menu of contractual choices—a 
collection of payoff-relevant alternatives—designed in such a 
way that the agent’s choice within the menu reveals her private 
information. In particular, as specified by contract theory, sep-
arating mechanisms can be designed either according to a mod-
el of “screening,”122 under which the principal takes action—as, 
for example, with an insurer’s request of an insurance deducti-
ble.123 Alternatively, such mechanisms can be designed accord-
 
 120. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic 
Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 587 (2008). 
 122. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 
Q.J. ECON. 629, 639–40 (1976) (introducing a seminal treatment of screening 
mechanisms where poorly informed agents extract information from the better 
informed, such as in the insurance context). 
 123. The intuition here is that only good types (i.e., low-risk prospective 
customers) will be willing to accept the deductible, as their lower risk propen-
sity makes them less likely to end up paying it. See id. 
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ing to a model of “signaling,” under which the agent takes ac-
tion,124 for example, with the offering of a seller’s warranty. 
Therefore, if it could be shown that either screening or sig-
naling mechanisms were available to shareholders ex ante (i.e., 
before hiring a manager) to separate good and bad managers, 
assuming away adverse selection issues would be justifiable. 
This is because in this case, the shareholders’ problem would be 
reduced solely to avoid moral hazard by good managers. Alter-
natively, it could be that incentive compensation is effective to 
address both issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
ensuing discussion, however, exposes both the lack of ex ante 
separating mechanisms to mitigate adverse selection issues in 
the shareholder-manager relationship and the limits of using 
incentive compensation to the same end. It therefore also ex-
poses an analytical framework that only incorporates the man-
agerial moral hazard problem as incomplete. 
1. The Lack of Ex Ante Separating Mechanisms 
How realistic is the assumption that ex ante mechanisms 
to separate good and bad managers are available to sharehold-
ers? If adverse selection was just a problem of incompetence—
the risk of hiring an unskilled or unqualified manager—one 
could reasonably argue that signaling mechanisms are availa-
ble to mitigate the problem. A manager’s educational records, 
industry expertise, reputational capital, and networking skills 
are all examples of credible signals that a manager can use (or 
a firm can acquire and consider) to that end. 
As highlighted by the simple illustration above, however, a 
manager’s hidden knowledge about her “type” does not just 
concern her competence or expertise. It also concerns a manag-
er’s hidden preferences and exclusive knowledge of business 
conditions. Designing an incentive-compatible contract for the-
se additional sources of adverse selection is much more prob-
 
 124. Adverse selection may not just be bad for the principal. When the 
principal cannot distinguish between good and bad types, he will pool them 
together, with the result being cross-subsidization: good types will receive 
worse terms (i.e., pay higher prices or receive lower rewards) than they would 
if their type was knowable, whereas bad types will receive far better terms. 
See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 491. In response to this problem, good types also 
have incentives to separate from bad types through the use of signaling. See 
generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) 
(providing a seminal treatment of signaling mechanisms where the better in-
formed take costly actions in the attempt to “signal” their type, such as in the 
job market). 
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lematic than in the case of managerial competence. For one 
thing, the “soft” nature of private information125 about a man-
ager’s preferences or knowledge of the business is likely to re-
duce the availability of signaling mechanisms. Information 
about a manager’s competence—for example, a manager’s edu-
cational records—tends to be verifiable by the shareholders 
once it is disclosed. Conversely, the nature of a manager’s in-
formation about her preferences or knowledge of the business 
may be more difficult for outsiders to verify, with the result 
that bad types may mimic good types by disclosing the same 
unverifiable soft information. 
Screening mechanisms are also unlikely to be available for 
these additional sources of adverse selection. On the one hand, 
the limited liability of the corporate form restricts the set of 
available contractual menus shareholders can offer to manag-
ers. It does so by preventing shareholders from imposing a neg-
ative payoff on the manager for the realization of a bad state of 
the world—such as the failure of an excessively risky project or 
a poor-quality project.126 Thus, while an insurer can use a de-
ductible to induce the revelation of information concerning a 
customer’s risk propensity, shareholders cannot employ a simi-
lar screening technology to extract ex ante information on the 
manager’s type. 
On the other hand, while shareholders could, in theory, re-
sort to a different menu of contracts, their incentives to in-
crease efficiency ex post—over the development of the relation-
ship with the agent—are likely to weaken the efficacy of any 
screening technology. This problem, which economists label 
“limited commitment” (or “time inconsistency”),127 is not exclu-
 
 125. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 126. An exception to this assumption arises under the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
clawback provision. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). This provision allows corporations to recover 
incentive-based compensation paid to managers if there is a financial restate-
ment due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any financial re-
porting requirements in the three-year period following the incentive’s pay-
ment. See id. This circumstance, however, can only capture a very small 
portion of bad managers, as it is premised on the assumption that the manag-
er’s private information becomes ex post observable and verifiable by a third-
party adjudicator. But this is a condition that is likely to be satisfied only in a 
small fraction of cases. 
 127. The seminal economic treatment of the “limited-commitment” problem 
in contract theory is Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Dynamics of In-
centive Contracts, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1153, 1158–59 (1988). The original intui-
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sive to the shareholder-manager context. Rather, it pervades 
all “dynamic” agency relationships involving asymmetric in-
formation and a temporal lag between the undertaking of the 
agent’s actions and the full realization of these actions and 
their consequences. 
Under these transactional features, a chosen incentive 
structure will often leave money on the table ex post.128 This 
produces a tension between modifying the initial contract to re-
duce ex post efficiency losses, and providing the agent with effi-
cient incentives ex ante (i.e., before the agent is hired). Because 
a rational agent anticipates that the initial incentives may not 
remain binding for the entire course of the relationship, those 
incentives become no longer attractive to her in the first place, 
which may lead to even greater efficiency losses. 
Thus, in the corporate context, a bad manager anticipates 
that revealing information on her type by choosing a given con-
tract within a menu will lead the shareholders to subsequently 
modify the contract. In particular—and unlike in other contexts 
where adverse selection issues may arise, such as the insurance 
market—shareholders can be expected to react to the disclosure 
of the manager’s bad type by either deciding not to hire the 
manager in the first place or firing her. Indeed, contracting 
with a bad type (i.e., a high-risk prospective customer) may still 
be profitable to an insurer as long as she can set ad hoc con-
tractual terms (i.e., higher insurance premiums). On the con-
trary, contracting with a bad manager tends to be always un-
profitable to shareholders. Therefore, it will generally be 
rational for a bad manager to hide her type. 
A modification of the above illustration will help to gain 
better understanding of the matter. For simplicity, since our 
 
tion, however, is credited to Ronald Coase, who first pointed out (in the famous 
Coase Conjecture) that in the absence of credible commitment, a durable-goods 
monopolist is unable to extract any rent. See R.H. Coase, Durability and Mo-
nopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143, 145–46 (1972). For discussions of the limited 
commitment problem in legal scholarship, see Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bi-
lateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 203, 231–33 (1997) (arguing that commitment problems provide a 
justification for prohibiting contractual modification); Talley, supra note 107, 
at 283, 350 (discussing the limited commitment problem that arises in the 
corporate opportunities context); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Hands-Tying in Principal-Agent Relationships: Venture Capital Financing, 
Publishing Contracts, and Academic Tenure (Dec. 1989) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (examining commitment problems in several con-
tractual contexts). 
 128. Talley, supra note 107, at 350. 
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goal is to show that ex ante separating mechanisms are not 
available to mitigate adverse selection issues in the corporate 
context, let us assume that the choice of available projects is 
limited to the Innovative Project (i.e., the production of an in-
novative computer) and the Bad Project (i.e., the production of 
an obsolete computer). Let us also assume that the menu of 
contracts offered by the shareholders to the prospective manag-
er included only two contracts. The first, or “Equity Contract,” 
provides for a managerial pay package that includes a high eq-
uity-compensation component and a low fixed-salary compo-
nent. The second contract, or “Salary Contract,” provides for a 
low equity-compensation component and a high fixed-salary 
component. In principle, this contractual menu should induce a 
Good Manager—who will undertake the Innovative Project—to 
select the Equity Contract, as she can be expected to be confi-
dent about the future success of the innovative computer. Con-
versely, a Bad Manager—who can only undertake the Bad Pro-
ject—should be motivated to choose the Salary Contract, as she 
will generally anticipate that an obsolete computer will soon 
fail to be competitive. 
A rational Bad Manager, however, will anticipate that the 
shareholders may have incentives to use the private infor-
mation revealed through her choice of a Salary Contract to sub-
sequently modify that contract, not hiring the manager in the 
first place or firing her straight after the disclosure of such in-
formation.129 As a result, the Bad Manager will also choose the 
Equity Contract and the shareholders will be unable to tell 
good managers apart from bad ones. 
2. The Limits of Incentive Compensation 
The prior Section has showed the general lack of ex ante 
separating mechanisms—either taking the form of signaling or 
screening devices—to address the adverse selection issues that 
arise in the shareholder-manager relationship. However, it 
could be argued that the incentives shareholders provide man-
agers for the purpose of reducing moral hazard are also effec-
tive to mitigate adverse selection. After all, a manager’s prefer-
ences or private information on the business only matter for the 
shareholders if the manager decides to act on that information 
 
 129. See supra note 119 (discussing how the example’s setting can be inter-
preted as referring to either the moment of a manager’s initial hiring or that of 
the subsequent review of a manager’s compensation). 
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to the shareholders’ detriment.130 From this perspective, if the 
incentives the shareholders provide to managers to avoid moral 
hazard could also prevent managers from opportunistically ex-
ploiting their hidden knowledge, assuming away adverse selec-
tion issues would be justified in practice, if not in theory. As 
this Section will explain, however, “bad” managerial types do 
not respond to incentives for optimal project selection. There-
fore, this Article argues that the crucial limit of incentive com-
pensation is adverse selection, rather than the risk of board 
capture, as claimed by shareholder advocates. 
The example introduced above is again useful to better il-
lustrate this conclusion. In the example’s context, assuming 
that incentive compensation can be used to effectively address 
both moral hazard and adverse selection implies that the 
shareholders could design an Equity Contract that makes it in-
dividually rewarding for the manager both to choose the Inno-
vative Project over the Regular Project, if the manager is Good, 
and the Innovative Project over the Bad Project, if the manager 
is Bad.131  
Two reasons, however, suggest that this contract will gen-
erally be unavailable to shareholders. The first reason concerns 
feasibility issues and is provided under standard economic 
models of moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, in moral 
hazard models, shareholders are assumed to know the nature 
and monetary value of the private benefits a manager can ex-
tract. In adverse selection models, however, they are assumed 
to lack these pieces of information.132 This implies that share-
holders cannot design an incentive-compatible contract that 
can at once address moral hazard and adverse selection, as 
they are uncertain about the incentives constraints that such a 
contract needs to satisfy. 
More concretely, in our illustration, the shareholders could 
anticipate the value to a Good Manager of saving the cost of ef-
fort and, therefore, be able to design a compensation contract 
 
 130. Put differently, if the manager’s action were perfectly observable by 
the shareholders, bad managers would not opportunistically exploit their pri-
vate information, as they would anticipate their behavior to trigger sharehold-
er retribution. 
 131. Unlike in the example in Part II.C.1, here we do not assume away 
moral hazard. It follows that a Good Manager can choose between the Regular 
Project and the Innovative Project. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 108–12 (listing the five factors 
that principals must anticipate in moral hazard models and the three factors 
that principals must anticipate within adverse selection models). 
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that rewards the manager for bearing this cost. However, in 
order to ensure that the manager’s compensation contract is al-
so effective for a bad type, the shareholders would need infor-
mation about the nature of the Bad Project and the benefits the 
manager derives from it, which they are assumed to lack. Thus, 
whether the bad type is driven to the Bad Project because of, 
for example, the lack of adequate skills, hubris, or to safeguard 
a prior personal relationship will affect the kind of incentives 
the shareholders need to provide the manager in order to make 
her compensation contract incentive-compatible. Without being 
privy to this information, then, the shareholders will be unable 
to design such a contract. 
The second reason that limits the effectiveness of incentive 
compensation to mitigate adverse selection is that even if 
shareholders were able to provide managers with the right in-
centives to avoid acting opportunistically on their hidden 
knowledge, doing so would be excessively costly to them.133 In-
deed, one could argue that shareholders do not need to have 
exact knowledge of a manager’s incentive constraints in order 
to design effective incentives. Conversely, it would be sufficient 
that shareholders held rational expectations about managerial 
behaviors, which they could reasonably infer from publicly 
available information. For example, in order to determine the 
expected engagement in private benefits extraction of a bad 
manager, shareholders could rely on information such as the 
kind of industry a firm is in, the nature of the firm’s business, 
the technology it employs, its existing projects, and so on. Un-
der these conditions, incentive constraints would no longer be 
uncertain, allowing shareholders to write contracts that can in-
duce the manager to behave. 
This argument, however, fails to take into account that 
contracts based on rational expectations about managerial be-
havior effectively pool good and bad types together.134 This is 
because rational expectations are necessarily based on average 
managerial behaviors, implying that, in practice, there will al-
ways be “worse” managerial types that misbehave more than 
the shareholders anticipate—for example, extracting higher 
than expected private benefits.  
 
 133. See infra Appendix Section B (illustrating the excessively costly result 
more tangibly). 
 134. If one assumes that managerial competence is a source of adverse se-
lection that can be addressed through screening mechanisms, the resulting 
equilibrium would be a semi-pooling. 
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Of course, this problem could be solved if the shareholders 
designed the contract so that its terms incentivize the worst 
possible types. Still, while this incentive design could be social-
ly optimal, it is unlikely to be individually optimal for the 
shareholders. In setting managerial incentives, rational share-
holders will factor in expectations about managerial behaviors 
as well as the distribution of managerial types, and then leave 
information rents (i.e., pecuniary incentives) to the manager up 
to the point where these rents’ marginal return equals their 
marginal cost. At an intuitive level, if the worst type is able to 
extract a very high private benefit, but the probability of deal-
ing with her is relatively low, the shareholders are likely to be 
better off by accepting the risk of dealing with the worst type 
than offering a very high information rent that can induce all 
agents to behave.135 
Under this conclusion, adverse selection, rather than board 
capture, emerges as the crucial limit of incentive compensation. 
As discussed above, shareholder advocates maintain that the 
risk of board capture makes designing compensation contracts 
that satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint impossible.136 
Underlying this view is the undisputable fact that the corpo-
rate role of CEOs and other executives give them the oppor-
tunity to influence outside board members. Yet, whether execu-
tives exploit this opportunity in the way described by 
shareholder advocates is a hypothesis that requires empirical 
verification and the empirical evidence gathered to date does 
not seem to support it.137  
 
 135. From this perspective, the shareholders’ decision to offer a contract 
that is incentive-compatible for only a fraction of managers endogenously de-
termines the level of adverse selection (i.e., the fraction of bad managers who 
do not respond to incentives). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67 (discussing how board cap-
ture negates the premise of incentive compatibility because principals can 
take an adversarial position against agents). 
 137. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., CEO Pay Redux, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
57–60 (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (documenting empirical evi-
dence that is inconsistent with the board capture hypothesis); Kevin J. 
Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2002); see also 
Fama & Jensen, supra note 40, at 315 (arguing that the anecdotal evidence 
negates the board-capture theory); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the Inter-
national CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1171, 1175–76 (2004) (arguing that the board capture theory does not explain 
several observations about CEO compensation). Further, it remains unclear 
how board capture could play a role in the setting of contracts of executives 
hired “from the outside,” i.e., having no prior or current ties to the existing 
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What matters most, however, is that even assuming that 
the risk of board capture could be eliminated—for example, by 
vesting shareholders with direct decision-making power over 
managerial compensation, as assumed in our illustration—the 
use of incentive compensation would still fail to fully protect 
shareholder interests. This is because once one factors in the 
problem of adverse selection, in addition to moral hazard, in-
centive compensation is not a viable means to ensure that 
managers will behave. 
III.  THE MORAL HAZARD-ADVERSE SELECTION 
TRADEOFF   
Part II has exposed the information structure of the share-
holder-manager relationship as being more complex—both in 
theory and in practice—than commonly assumed in corporate 
law scholarship. This Part argues that this information com-
plexity further increases when one takes into account that 
moral hazard and adverse selection are competing problems, 
whose solutions expose shareholders to a weightier corporate 
governance tradeoff than commonly understood. This tradeoff 
arises because trying to control adverse selection ex post—by 
strengthening the shareholders’ power to promptly remove bad 
managers—may distort the ex ante contractual incentives em-
ployed to promote managerial effort. 
A. SHAREHOLDER REMOVAL IN THE SHADOW OF ADVERSE 
SELECTION 
Under the standard information account of the sharehold-
er-manager relationship, the right to remove directors, and 
hence, their managers, is described as one of the essential pow-
ers at shareholders’ disposal to mitigate the moral hazard prob-
lem.138 Shareholder advocates, in particular, defend the need for 
unconstrained removal—the exercise of removal unencumbered 
by the adoption of defensive measures or other obstacles—as 
necessary for efficient corporate governance.139 Indeed, only by 
 
board of directors. Shareholder advocates describe board capture as arising 
from board members being “connected to executives by bonds of interest, colle-
giality, or affinity.” Bebchuk et al., supra note 30. Such bonds, however, are 
unlikely to be in place in the case of a newly hired CEO. See Murphy, supra 
note 137, at 850, 852–54 (documenting empirical evidence on outside hires 
that is inconsistent with the board capture hypothesis). 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
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ensuring that shareholders have an unconstrained power to re-
place directors and managers could the risks of entrenchment 
and board capture be kept under control.  
As to the shareholders’ ability of taking accurate removal 
decisions, the economic assumption is that changes in a firm’s 
stock prices provide a sufficient statistic on managerial and di-
rectorial performance under the semi-strong form of the Effi-
cient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH).140 In other words, 
because opportunistic managers and captured directors would 
be statistically more likely to be associated with low stock pric-
es, shareholders could rely on changes in a firm’s stock prices 
for guidance on removal decisions. 
While this approach to the shareholders’ removal power is 
intuitively straightforward, this Article argues that it neverthe-
less provides an incomplete account of the function of this pow-
er. First, this approach fails to consider adverse selection is-
sues. Second, it stands against standard economic assumptions 
about the use of incentive compensation as a helpful means to 
mitigate moral hazard. Perhaps more importantly, it also runs 
opposite to the widespread adoption of incentive-based mana-
gerial compensation schemes we observe in the real corporate 
world. 
Incorporating these facts into the analysis of the share-
holders’ removal power suggests that a neglected—and, yet, 
pivotal—function of such a power is to reduce adverse selection 
costs. As discussed in Part II, in the corporate context no incen-
tive-compatible mechanisms are available to mitigate the prob-
lem of adverse selection ex ante, i.e., before a manager is hired. 
This suggests that while the power of removal can offer a com-
plementary remedy against moral hazard, it is likely most help-
ful as an ex post remedy against the hire of a bad manager. It 
does so by enabling shareholders to promptly get rid of a man-
ager should her performance, as impounded in a firm’s stock 
price, induce them to believe she is a bad type. 
Within this theoretical framework, removal primarily mat-
ters to shareholders for reasons different than those defended 
by shareholder advocates. Nevertheless, if the issue was only 
that removal is likely most helpful to address problems of ad-
verse selection than moral hazard, these advocates would still 
have a point in defending shareholders’ newly found ability to 
exercise removal virtually at all times.  
 
 140. See supra note 71. 
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This conclusion, however, no longer holds true once the 
complexity of the information problems imbuing the sharehold-
er-manager relationship is considered in full. Indeed, this com-
plexity, as shown in the next Section, challenges the sharehold-
ers’ ability to exercise removal effectively, raising costs that 
may exceed the expected benefits of removal. 
B. UNINFORMATIVE MARKET PRICES 
Shareholder advocates assume that a firm’s stock price 
provides a sufficient statistic on managerial performance and 
hence guidance for accurate removal decisions. What these ad-
vocates do not consider, however, is that this assumption 
weakens to the extent a manager invests in a specific long-term 
project where there is a lag between the time the investment is 
made and when its value is realized. Classic examples of these 
projects include investments in innovation and other intangible 
“knowledge” assets, such as ideas, patents, brands, software, 
copyrights, and the like.141 Importantly, these investments have 
become a defining feature in modern corporate production, as 
today’s corporations derive most of their value from the ability 
to access, transfer and assemble specific “knowledge,” rather 
than from tangible assets (such as land, machines, raw materi-
als, buildings, and the like).142 Thus, while it may be tempting 
to downplay the importance of specific long-term investments 
as only affecting the “usual suspects”—companies such as 
Google, Facebook, Apple, Tesla, and the like—a recent study 
documents that 80% of the market value of U.S. corporations is 
nowadays represented by intangible assets.143 
The shift from tangible to intangible investments has fun-
damental implications for asset pricing efficiency. Tangible as-
sets are visible, meaning that the quality of a firm’s investment 
in a new plant or the purchase of land to build new headquar-
ters can generally be capitalized on a corporation’s balance 
sheet and, therefore, observed by investors as hard (i.e., verifi-
able) information. On the contrary, investments in intangibles 
tend to mostly involve “soft” information, which are difficult for 
 
 141. For a more concrete exemplification, recall the Innovative Project from 
the illustration in Part II.A. 
 142. See BIG INNOVATION CTR., THE PURPOSEFUL COMPANY–INTERIM RE-
PORT, 5, 14 (2016), http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/media/uploads/pdf/ 
The%20Purposeful%20Company%20Interim%20Report.pdf. 
 143. See Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRITISH ACAD. 53, 
54 (2016). 
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outsiders to verify even if disclosed to them. Meanwhile, chan-
neling resources to such investments typically demand large 
capital expenditures up-front and thus tend to decrease short-
term earnings, which is a type of hard information that the 
current stock price can more easily incorporate.144  
Under these transactional features, the shareholder advo-
cates’ assumption that short-term and long-term changes in 
value tend to be positively correlated145 may no longer hold 
true. On the contrary, prices may fail to fully capture the impli-
cations of a firm’s specific long-term investment until those im-
plications begin to show up in cash flows over time, being there-
fore largely uninformative in the short term.146 
The possibility of uninformative short-term market prices 
challenges the assumption that shareholders can exercise the 
power of removal efficiently by relying on market prices infor-
mation. Two basic economic facts support this conclusion. First, 
bad types are statistically more likely to be associated with a 
disappointing firm outcome (i.e., low earnings).147 Second, the 
short-term inability of good managers to support communica-
tion about the quality of a specific long-term investment with 
hard information makes it especially difficult for good types to 
send credible signals to shareholders. As a result, shareholders 
may rationally, but inefficiently, respond to the short-term fall 
 
 144. See Edmans et al., supra note 23. 
 145. See Bebchuk, supra note 92, at 1663. 
 146. More technically, uninformative short-term prices are “nonmonotonic” 
in the sense that they do not follow a consistent informational pattern due to 
the information asymmetry problems existing between shareholders and man-
agers. The economic mechanisms explaining such inconsistency hinges on 
Bayesian updating, which identifies the process through which rational inves-
tors update their beliefs about firm value. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News 
and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 
380 (1981). It is also worth emphasizing that the possibility of uninformative 
prices does not require discarding the semi-strong version of the ECMH hy-
pothesis. Because the root cause of uninformative prices lies in the insiders’ 
private knowledge of business conditions, assuming that market contracting 
accurately reflects all available public information does not change the conclu-
sion that the market may fail to perceive actions that are expected to be posi-
tive in the long term as positive in the short term. 
 147. Managers who engage in moral hazard are also statistically more like-
ly to be associated with low stock prices. However, under the assumption that 
incentive compensation helps mitigate the problem of managerial moral haz-
ard, it is more likely that a low stock price might be interpreted as signaling a 
bad type, rather than a good but opportunistic one. In any event, whether 
shareholders interpret a low firm outcome as signaling a bad type or an oppor-
tunistic one does not change the conclusion that they will have incentives to 
exercise removal upon observing such an outcome. 
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in stock price that may follow a specific long-term investment 
by exercising their removal power (or even just by threatening 
removal in order to force changes to existing firm policies), alt-
hough that outcome might be the result of uninformative short-
term prices rather than the reflection of a manager’s bad type. 
C. STRATEGIC SIGNALING 
The potential for inaccurate removal decisions by share-
holders raises substantial costs. These costs are not limited to 
the expected loss of value caused by the mistaken removal of a 
good manager or the pressure for inefficient changes in a firm’s 
investment policy. More significantly, in the struggle to achieve 
separation and avoid removal, good managers may develop a 
preference for strategic signaling: undertaking projects that are 
expected to improve the shareholders’ perception of their type 
even if this comes at the expense of optimal project selection.148 
On the one hand, managers may be induced to pass up profita-
ble specific long-term projects, as these projects are more likely 
to result in “early failure,” i.e., trigger a short-term decline in 
stock prices. On the other, they may prefer short-termist strat-
egies, which yield high short-term returns at the expense of 
long-term firm value, as these strategies improve a manager’s 
chances at separating from bad types and, hence, avoid remov-
al.149 
 
 148. See Ayres, supra note 107, at 397–400 (discussing how the existence of 
corporations with bad projects and their incentives to mimic the signals sent 
by corporations with good projects imposes an externality on the latter, induc-
ing them to engage in inefficient excessive signaling). 
 149. The theoretical models of managerial myopia that appeared in the 
1980s, during the takeover era, pioneered the study of these distortions, mak-
ing formal connections between an excessive, takeover-driven focus on stock-
market results and the risk of short-termism. These models were pioneered by 
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole, and Jeremy Stein. See Jean-Jacques 
Laffont & Jean Tirole, Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, 
and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 516, 
529–31 (1988) (showing formally that if investments are invisible, high in-
vestments might be mistaken for low effort and increase the likelihood of a 
takeover); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A 
Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 656–61 (1989) (mod-
eling suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of 
near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats 
and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62–67 (1988) (showing formally 
that managers of a firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced as-
set). Under the influence of neoclassical economic thinking, however, main-
stream corporate legal theory barely took notice of myopia studies, at least un-
til the 2007–08 financial crisis. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
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This analysis reveals the existence of a basic corporate 
governance trade-off between addressing the problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. This trade-off arises out of the 
distortions that the use of the shareholders’ power of removal 
to control adverse selection ex post may induce ex ante in the 
contractual incentives that should promote managerial effort. If 
good managers were not exposed to a higher risk of removal for 
the realization of a low short-term outcome, undertaking prof-
itable long-term specific projects would generally be individual-
ly efficient for them under the “right” incentive scheme. How-
ever, under the risk of false matching by bad types and the 
threat of short-term removal, the reward a good manager ex-
pects to receive for selecting a specific long-term project is like-
ly to be outweighed by the higher expected risk of removal she 
bears under this project. This risk might then induce even a 
good manager to become unresponsive to incentives for optimal 
project selection, interfering with both shareholder and aggre-
gate welfare maximization. 
Our illustration in Part II.A is again useful to discuss these 
dynamics more concretely.150 Recall that under the illustration’s 
setting there are only three kinds of projects a prospective 
manager can undertake: the Regular Project (i.e., the restyling 
of a successful computer), the Innovative Project (i.e., the pro-
duction of an innovative computer) and the Bad Project (i.e., 
the production of an obsolete computer). The illustration also 
poses that only a Bad Manager can undertake a Bad Project, 
with Bad Managers representing 20% of the overall managerial 
population.  
Assume now that, consistent with the riskier nature of the 
Innovative Projects, in the short-term this project delivers a 
payoff of 100 with a probability of 80% and zero otherwise, 
while the safer Regular Project delivers a payoff of 100 with 
certainty. Recall, however, that the Innovative Project is more 
valuable than the Regular Project over time.151 The Bad Project, 
 
The Eclipse of the Shareholder Paradigm 56–57 (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 150. This modification of the illustration introduced in Part II focuses on 
the effects of adverse selection on managerial incentives. This Article’s Appen-
dix provides a more rigorous treatment where the problem of moral hazard 
and adverse selection are considered simultaneously. See infra Appendix Sec-
tion C. It is also worth emphasizing that the illustration’s results are robust to 
changes in numerical parameters. 
 151. The assumption here is that the expected long-term returns from the 
Innovative Project more than compensate for the lower expected returns this 
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on the other hand, delivers a short-term payoff of 100 with only 
a 10% probability, while also being the least profitable in the 
long term. Further assume that the shareholders have written 
the manager’s compensation contract so to provide a prospec-
tive Good Manager with the right pecuniary incentives to pre-
fer the Innovative Project to the Regular Project. Finally as-
sume that—as advocated by the supporters of shareholder 
primacy and as it is increasingly the case in the current corpo-
rate scenario with empowered shareholders—the shareholders 
in our illustration are granted an unconstrained power of re-
moval, so that they can promptly remove the manager if they 
deem the manager to be Bad. 
Against this setting, let us consider the case where the 
shareholders observe a zero payoff in the short term, which can 
either come from the undertaking of the Innovative Project or 
the Bad Project. The shareholders will then have to decide 
whether to retain the manager or remove her depending on 
their inference about the manager’s type. In the jargon of game 
theorists, the process through which shareholders form this in-
ference is called “updating beliefs” and works as follows. Before 
observing the payoff from the short term, the shareholders will 
have a given “prior” on the probability that they might be deal-
ing with a good or bad manager. This prior coincides with the 
distribution of types: in our illustration, the shareholders thus 
believe they might hire a Good Manager with an 80% probabil-
ity and a Bad Manager with a 20% probability. After observing 
the payoff from the short term, however, the shareholders will 
form a new (or updated) belief—referred to as “posterior”—on 
the probability they might be dealing with a Good or Bad Man-
ager. Specifically, rational shareholders will determine their 
posterior pursuant to the Bayes’ Rule,152 under which 
Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100] is equal to: 
Upon observing a zero payoff in the short term, the share-
holders will thus believe to be dealing with a Good Manager 
with a probability equal to (0.8×0.2)/[(0.8×0.2)+(0.2×0.9)]= 
 
project delivers in the short-term. See infra Appendix Figure 1 (summarizing 
the characteristics of each project). 
 152. See MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 11–12 
(Wiley Classics Library 2004) (1970). 
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47.1%. Accordingly, as the probability they might be dealing 
with a Bad Manager is higher than the probability they might 
be dealing with a Good one, the shareholders will rationally de-
cide that removal is the right action to take. 
A Good Manager, however, will anticipate the sharehold-
ers’ future beliefs, adjusting her behavior accordingly. In par-
ticular, the manager understands that she will continue to be 
employed only if the shareholders observe a short-term payoff 
of 100 (i.e., a high short-term firm outcome). This will occur 
with probability 80% when the manager chooses the Innovative 
Project; conversely, it will occur with certainty if she chooses 
the Regular Project, which involves a more standardized, and 
hence safer, investment. In other words, a Good Manager is 
aware that selecting the Regular Project increases the short-
term likelihood that the shareholders will believe she is a good 
type and, therefore, her chances to avoid removal. Indeed, 
when the shareholders observe a short-term payoff of 100, their 
posterior on the probability that the manager is Good under the 
Bayes’ Rule becomes: (0.8×1)/[(0.8×1)+(0.2 0.1)]=97.6%.  
Under similar circumstances, as shown more analytically 
in this Article’s Appendix,153 the preference a Good Manager 
develops for strategic signaling will make the pursuing of the 
Innovative Project no longer profitable to the manager even 
under the “right” pecuniary incentives. This is because under 
the threat of short-term removal by the shareholders, the high-
er expected loss the manager bears for the risk of losing future 
payoffs under the Innovative Project outweighs her expected 
reward for undertaking that project. Hence, choosing the Regu-
lar Project—engaging in strategic signaling—is a Good Manag-
er’s best response when she is exposed to the threat of short-
term removal by the shareholders. 
IV.  TOWARD A NEW CORPORATE MODEL   
Part III has discussed the positive implications arising 
from the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection is-
sues in the shareholder-manager relationship, showing that the 
competing nature of these problems exposes shareholders to a 
fundamental—and yet largely overlooked—governance 
tradeoff. 
 
 153. See infra Appendix Section C. 
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This Part turns to analyzing the normative implications of 
this tradeoff. Section A shows that a regime of “time-
consistent”154 removal decisions, under which the shareholders’ 
power of removal is delayed to the longer term, facilitates the 
moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff. It does so by ensuring 
that removal decisions are constrained to a time when market 
prices are more likely to accurately gauge information on man-
agerial types and the fundamental value of a firm’s investment 
choices. 
Sections B and C explain why both the shareholder prima-
cy model and the board primacy model are inconsistent with 
the above theoretical result. 
Last, Section D demonstrates that a competing corporate 
model with virtually exclusive board authority in the short 
term and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer term is 
better suited to implement a time-consistent removal regime. A 
board protected from shareholder pressure is more likely to be 
biased toward tolerating the occurrence of disappointing firm 
outcomes. Hence, a biased, insulated board can be expected to 
reduce the risk that imperfectly informed shareholders might 
inefficiently remove a good manager upon what may appear to 
them as an early failure. From this perspective, in the short 
term a board’s bias provides a beneficial commitment device to 
the longer-term evaluation of managerial decisions. Over time, 
however, a board’s bias might grow excessive, while market 
prices can be expected to provide shareholders with a more ac-
curate informational focal point. Therefore, in the long run 
board authority should be relaxed in favor of granting share-
holders stronger governance rights, including an unconstrained 
power of removal. 
A. TIME-CONSISTENT REMOVAL DECISIONS 
Under the incorporation of adverse selection into the anal-
ysis of the shareholder-manager relationship, trying to control 
the problem of bad managers by strengthening the sharehold-
ers’ power of removal—so to allow shareholders to exercise such 
power potentially at any time—may impair the shareholders’ 
ability to successfully incentivize managerial effort. Yet, in 
light of the lack of ex ante separating mechanisms and the lim-
its of incentive compensation, removal remains the only means 
available to shareholders to lower the cost of hiring a bad man-
 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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ager. Economically, this points to the need of finding an “interi-
or solution,”
 
under which mitigating one information problem 
does not occur at the expense of exacerbating the other.155 
It is rather intuitive to see why a governance model that 
provides for a “time-consistent removal” regime offers this solu-
tion. Under this regime, shareholders would commit to the 
longer-term evaluation of directorial and managerial actions 
and, more generally, to avoid using the threat of removal to in-
terfere with incumbent actions in the short term.156 This would 
ensure that removal decisions are taken by shareholders when 
market prices can be expected to more accurately reflect infor-
mation on the fundamental value of a firm’s investment choic-
es, thereby reducing the risk of inefficient removal of good 
managers and, hence, strategic signaling.  
Football fans should easily grasp the intuition here. A foot-
ball coach will have a better inference of her team’s strengths 
and weaknesses as the football season proceeds and the num-
ber of games increases. Thus, completely reorganizing a team 
simply because it loses the first one or two games of the season 
would be a poor decision on her part. Doing so when the rest of 
the season progresses poorly, however, becomes the rational 
decision to make. Similarly shareholders will be better posi-
tioned to evaluate managerial decisions (and, hence, manageri-
al types), as the value implications of those decisions begin to 
materialize in streams of cash flows over time. As a result, the 
benefit removal offers against adverse selection will be less 
likely to come at the expense of the introduction of distortions 
in the incentives designed to promote managerial effort. 
If this conclusion is correct—that a time-consistent remov-
al regime facilitates the moral hazard-adverse selection 
tradeoff—we would expect that a Good Manager’s incentives to 
undertake the Innovative Project are better preserved when the 
shareholders in our illustration are required to wait until after 
the short term to decide on managerial removal. To test this 
conjecture, let us modify our setting so to introduce an inter-
mediate realization between the short term and the long 
term—the medium term. Since our illustration poses that the 
company is eventually liquidated in the long term, adding this 
 
 155. See MICHAEL CARTER, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 
502 (2001) (defining an interior solution as an interior point of the feasible set 
of solutions to an optimization problem). 
 156. For examples regarding time-consistent removal, see infra Appendix 
Section D. 
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intermediate realization allows us to explore the welfare impli-
cations of delaying the exercise of the shareholders’ power of 
removal over the longer term but, of course, before the company 
is liquidated. 
For simplicity, let us also assume that the structure of the 
medium-term payoffs is identical to that of the short-term pay-
offs for each of the available projects. Hence, in both the short 
term and the medium term, the Innovative Project delivers a 
payoff of 100 with probability 80% and zero otherwise, the Reg-
ular Project delivers a payoff of 100 with certainty, and the Bad 
Project delivers a payoff of 100 with a 10% probability. Howev-
er, as above, in the long term, the Innovative Project is more 
profitable than the Regular Project, while the Bad Project is the 
least profitable project. The distribution of types also remains 
the same, with Bad Managers representing 20% of the overall 
managerial population. 
As above, the shareholders will then have to decide wheth-
er to retain the manager or remove her depending on their in-
ference about the manager’s type. Here, however, the share-
holders will have to wait until the end of the medium term 
before being able to make such a decision. Analytically, this 
implies that the shareholders will apply the Bayes’ Rule se-
quentially in order to update their belief on the manager’s type, 
factoring in the observation of a stream of payoffs (i.e., the 
short-term realization plus the medium-term realization) as 
well as the observation of these payoffs’ order.157 For conven-
ience, Figure 1 below summarizes the shareholders’ posteriors 
after observing any possible combination of payoffs yielded in 
the short and medium term.158 
 
 157. See Milgrom, supra note 146, at 381–82, 385–87. 
 158. Infra Appendix Section D details the calculations of the shareholders’ 
posterior for each possible combination of payoffs. 
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Figure 1: Medium-Term Posterior Beliefs 
 
Consistent with this Article’s theoretical predictions, Fig-
ure 1 shows that the shareholders gain a much better inference 
about the likelihood that a manager be Good or Bad when they 
are required to wait until the medium term before deciding on 
managerial removal. Recall that with the observation of only a 
zero short-term payoff, the shareholders believed the manager 
to be Good with a 47.1% probability.159 When the shareholders 
can rely on two consecutive payoffs, instead, their posterior be-
comes much more accurate. On the one hand, if the sharehold-
ers observe two consecutive zero payoffs, they can be consider-
ably more confident that the manager is Bad, as there is only a 
16.5% probability that the manager might be Good under these 
realizations. Conversely, if the shareholders observe a short-
term payoff of zero and then a payoff of 100,160 they can be ra-
ther confident that the manager is Good, as this probability in-
creases to 87.7% under these alternative realizations. 
The explanation behind these results is rather straightfor-
ward. In the short term, in light of the possibility of uninforma-
tive market prices, a Good Manager pursuing an Innovative 
Project and a Bad Manager may both end up with zero returns 
so that a Bad Manager can easily mimic a Good one. However, 
in the medium term, when the implications of managerial 
choices can be expected to be more accurately impounded in 
firm outcomes, a Bad Manager is much more likely than a Good 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 152 (using Bayes’ Rule to determine 
that the Manager would be Good with a probability of 47.1%). 
 160. The case where the shareholders observe a short-term payoff of 100, 
whether followed by another payoff of 100 or a zero payoff in the medium-
term, does not pose a problem as per the discussion in Part III.C. 
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Manager to deliver two consecutive zero payoffs, with the result 
that false matching becomes a more remote possibility. This 
means, in practice, that the risk that the shareholders may 
mistakenly fire a Good Manager (or, likewise, mistakenly re-
tain a Bad Manager) is considerably reduced under a time-
consistent removal regime. As a result—as illustrated more an-
alytically in this Article’s Appendix Section D—Good Managers 
will have fewer incentives for strategic signaling.161 
B. THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT 
This Article’s analysis of the information problems imbuing 
the shareholder-manager relationship, and these problems’ 
normative implications, bears critical challenges for the advo-
cates of shareholder primacy. 
As a theoretical matter, this analysis exposes the problem 
of short-termism that arises from strengthening the sharehold-
ers’ power of removal (and, more generally, from increasing 
shareholders’ governance rights) to be much more pervasive 
than recognized by shareholder advocates. Indeed, short-
termism is not just the result of the pressure of some share-
holders with excessive discounting preferences. It is, instead, 
the ultimate consequence of a causal chain that starts with ad-
verse selection and asset pricing inefficiencies—that is, market 
imperfections that affect all shareholders as a matter of course.  
Further, as a practical matter, the changes that have oc-
curred in corporate governance in the past fifteen years—from 
the rise of hedge funds to the decline in the use and effective-
ness of defensive measures162—suggest that the problem of 
short-termism might be as severe as ever today. Indeed, the in-
creased ability shareholders have acquired to throw incum-
bents out of office at any time, combined with the increased 
growing importance of intangible assets and private manageri-
al information, make it more likely that today’s managers may 
develop short-termist incentives. Recent evidence that U.S. 
corporations are increasingly curbing long-term investments in 
favor of short-term “liquidity events,” such as more frequent 
dividend payouts and stock buybacks,163 is thus hardly surpris-
ing, although not less troubling. 
 
 161. See infra Appendix Section D. 
 162. See supra Part I.B (exploring the timeline of the rise of empowered 
shareholders from the late 1970s until today). 
 163. Since the 1990s, for example, U.S. nonfinancial corporations have dis-
  
2017] BOARD AND SHAREHOLDER POWER 1425 
 
Nonetheless, a shareholder advocate could respond that 
this Article’s conclusion about the inefficiency engendered by 
the increased shareholders’ ability to promptly remove manag-
ers (or otherwise exert pressure on incumbents) does not neces-
sarily make the shareholder primacy model less desirable than 
the traditional board primacy model.  
This argument would go as follows. First, this Article’s dis-
cussion of the information problems imbuing the shareholder-
manager relationship does not challenge the argument that 
shareholders should enjoy an effective power of removal. Ra-
ther it defends the merits of time-consistent removal decisions 
against the inefficiency of short-term removal decisions. Se-
cond, this Article’s analysis has so far largely proceeded on the 
classic principal-agent model assumption that the shareholder-
manager relationship can be represented as a bilateral rela-
tionship, therefore abstracting from the role of the board of di-
rectors.164 Once this role is factored in, however, it might create 
complexities for the exercise of time-consistent removal deci-
sions, unless shareholder authority over the corporate affairs 
has teeth. 
As explained in Part I, under the traditional board-centric 
model, decisions on managerial termination belong to the 
board, although shareholders are granted the right to remove 
board members and, then, also incumbent managers. This 
means, in practice, that if the shareholders’ right to remove 
board members is not effective—as shareholders advocates ar-
gue is the case when the board can adopt defensive measures or 
is otherwise protected by shareholder pressure—the board will 
 
gorged $50 to $200 billion more in cash annually to shareholders through re-
purchase programs than they have raised through the issue of new shares. See 
Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
685, 718–19 (2015). Standard & Poor’s also recently reported that dividends 
and stock buybacks in the United States totaled a record of more than $900 
billion in 2014. See Martin Lipton et al., Some Thoughts for Boards of Direc-
tors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9, 
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/some-thoughts-for-boards-of 
-directors-in-2016. Similarly, a study from the Roosevelt Institute reported 
that “between the second half of 2009 through 2013, corporations borrowed 
nearly $900 billion, but paid out $740 billion to shareholders, while investing 
only $400 billion.” John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: 
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 59–60 (Colum-
bia Law Sch., Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 521, 2015), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2656325. 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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hold exclusive decision-making power over managerial removal 
decisions. According to shareholder advocates, this poses a ma-
jor risk for efficient corporate governance, as potentially cap-
tured boards could not be trusted when it comes to evaluating 
managerial accountability.165 Therefore, a shareholder advocate 
would conclude that a shareholder primacy model should still 
be preferred to a board-centric model, although plausibly con-
ceding that this model would need to be modified so to ensure 
that shareholders commit to the longer-term evaluation of di-
rectorial and managerial decisions. Under this modified version 
of shareholder primacy, shareholders would still retain an ef-
fective power of removal that cannot be trumped by board au-
thority, but commit to exercise that power only in the longer 
term. 
Although this Article shares the premises of this argu-
ment—about preserving the effectiveness of the shareholders’ 
removal power and incorporating the role of the board of direc-
tors—it submits that such an argument neglects to consider a 
crucial factor: the inability of shareholders to credibly commit 
to a time-consistent removal regime. As discussed earlier, a 
limited commitment problem is the result of the tension that 
arises in any dynamic relationship involving asymmetric in-
formation and a temporal lag between the undertaking of the 
agent’s actions and the full realization of those actions.166 In 
this information environment, parties have incentives to elimi-
nate the efficiency losses that may arise ex post over the devel-
opment of the relationship. Yet, acting in this way may under-
mine initial, ex ante attempts at implementing efficient 
transactional structures, ultimately leading to even greater ef-
ficiency losses. 
In the corporate context, rational shareholders can be ex-
pected to ex ante understand that a commitment to the longer-
term evaluation of directorial and managerial actions serves 
their interest, as it facilitates the moral hazard-adverse selec-
tion tradeoff. However, ex post—that is, upon observing a dis-
appointing short-term outcome—they are unable to remain 
faithful to that commitment. Because bad managers are more 
likely to be associated with disappointing firm outcomes and 
good managers tend to be unable to send signals supported by 
 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing shareholder ad-
vocates’ concerns about the accountability of boards and their ability to further 
shareholder interests). 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
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hard (i.e., verifiable) information in the short-term, sharehold-
ers will rationally believe there is a high probability that the 
manager is bad (and the board is captured) upon observing a 
short-term low stock price.167 As a result, in the attempt to limit 
the efficiency losses engendered by adverse selection, share-
holders will make the rational decision of removing incum-
bents. And herein lies the problem: anticipating that the 
shareholders’ commitment to time-consistent removal decisions 
is not binding in case of early failure and that specific long-
term projects are more likely to trigger such failure, managers 
will engage in strategic signaling, causing shareholders even 
greater efficiency losses.168 
Examined against the shareholders’ limited commitment 
problem, the search for a governance model that can facilitate 
time-consistent removal decisions moves in a different direc-
tion. As explained next, this direction starts with a novel un-
derstanding of the role served by the board of directors, which 
neither coincides with the vicious board depicted by sharehold-
er advocates, nor the virtuous one defended by board advocates. 
C. VIRTUES AND VICES OF BIASED BOARDS 
Shareholder advocates see board capture as the major ob-
stacle to effective managerial accountability and hence claim 
that enhancing the shareholders’ power of removal is necessary 
to ensure this accountability. On the polar opposite side, board 
advocates defend board authority as necessary to preserve the 
board’s informational advantage about private managerial in-
 
 167. See infra Appendix Section C (analyzing strategic signally of manag-
ers); see also Fama, supra note 71. 
 168. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that while a market-driven 
shareholders’ commitment to time-consistent removal decisions is not credible, 
a formal contractual commitment would be credible. Yet, this solution is un-
likely to be feasible, as it would require all of a firm’s shareholders to contrac-
tually undertake not to exercise removal until the long term. Otherwise, the 
ability of just one shareholder to exercise its removal power in the short term 
would make the other shareholders’ “commitment contract” useless to reduce 
the likelihood of strategic signaling. Multilateral bargaining of this kind, how-
ever, seems unlikely to succeed in the context of the well-known collective ac-
tion problems affecting shareholders. It could be further argued, however, that 
under current patterns of increased ownership re-concentration, in some cases 
the number of investors might be relatively low, which would facilitate cooper-
ative investor behavior. Yet, even assuming that a firm’s existing shareholders 
could successfully agree to a commitment contract, this would not solve the 
problem of future shareholders, which should also be necessarily bound by 
such a contract. 
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formation and, thereby, reduce the risk of short-termism. Thus, 
under this Article’s terms, if shareholder advocates conceive of 
board authority as the major source of the risk that a bad man-
ager may not be removed when it would be efficient doing so, 
board advocates defend the board as being better positioned to 
avoid the mistaken removal of a good manager. 
As discussed earlier, however, shareholder advocates claim 
that in today’s corporate environment—where boards have 
come to include a large majority of independent directors and 
investors have gained increased sophistication—the argument 
of the board’s informational advantage about private manage-
rial information has lost much of its force.169 This Article recog-
nizes that this claim cannot be dismissed as unfounded. At the 
same time, however, this claim should not be held universally 
valid, as one cannot radically exclude that the insider position 
of board members may give them an informational advantage 
over outside investors. More importantly, even assuming that 
the board had no informational advantage at all, this Article 
defends a stronger reason for expecting a board to be less likely 
to mistakenly remove a good manager. This reason is the bias a 
board of directors is likely to have toward retaining incumbent 
management. 
A board’s bias toward incumbent managers can be thought 
of as stemming from the very same reasons that, according to 
shareholder advocates, promote board capture: the bonds of in-
terest, collegiality and affinity that are likely to develop over 
time between managers and board members. These advocates 
draw drastic consequences from these bonds, suggesting that 
capture would make directors largely subservient to manage-
ment and incapable of providing efficient incentives.170 This Ar-
ticle, as discussed earlier, rejects this claim.171 Nevertheless, it 
recognizes that the existence of these bonds might induce a 
board to be more tolerant than outside investors in evaluating 
managerial performance. Current board appointment rules 
emphasizing independency requirements are likely to add to a 
board’s bias, as the time constraints and expertise limitations 
affecting the participation of independent directors can be ex-
 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 99–05. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing the shareholder 
concerns about board capture). 
 171. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing how the claim of board capture 
seems to be both theoretically and empirically unfounded). 
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pected to play in favor of a greater deference to incumbent 
management. 
Given the likelihood that a board might be biased in favor 
of incumbent managers, when the removal decision exclusively 
belongs to the board—as it occurs, in practice, when the board 
is protected from removal through the adoption of defensive 
measures—it will be less likely that a disappointing short-term 
firm outcome may trigger managerial removal.172 A further 
modification of the illustration introduced in Part II.A is useful 
to show this conclusion more analytically. To this end, let us 
modify the illustration’s assumptions so as to pose that the 
board of directors, rather than the shareholders, holds decision-
making power over managerial removal. Let us also introduce a 
measure of bias, β, which is designed to capture the distortion 
from the perfect Bayesian updating that one can expect to see 
when the removal decision is exclusively delegated to the 
board.173 Under this bias, the board can be assumed to assess 
its posterior based on the observed payoff realization only with 
probability 1–β, meaning that with probability β the board will 
believe the manager to be Good even upon the realization of a 
disappointing firm outcome. 
Under these assumptions, and posing, as above, that the 
board observes a zero payoff at the end of the short term, the 
board will consider the manager to be Good with probability 
β×1+(1–β)×0.471, where 0.471 (i.e., 47.1%) is the likelihood that 
the shareholders would believe a manager to be Good under the 
same circumstances.174 Now, posing that the board is only 
slightly biased, so that it can be assumed that β=0.2, this im-
plies that the board will consider the manager to be Good with 
a probability of 57.7%. Therefore, because the board’s posterior 
suggests that the manager is more likely to be Good than Bad, 
the board will arguably not remove the manager—as the 
shareholders would, instead, most likely do under the same cir-
cumstances (given the lower 47.1% probability with which they 
would hold the manager to be Good). 
However, while this Article shares the board advocates’ 
claim that the board of directors is better positioned than 
shareholders to avoid the mistaken removal of a good manager, 
 
 172. Note that whether a board is biased in good or bad faith does not 
change the conclusion that a board is less likely than shareholders to remove a 
manager upon a low short-term outcome. 
 173. See supra Part III.C. 
 174. For more mathematical explanations, see infra Appendix Section E. 
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it does not share the conclusion that this makes a governance 
model with perpetually exclusive board authority normatively 
desirable. The rationale for rejecting this conclusion is that a 
board’s bias toward incumbent management might grow exces-
sive in the longer term. Indeed, the same reasons that make a 
board less likely to remove a good manager in the short term 
may produce countervailing effects in the longer term, making 
a board similarly less likely to efficiently remove a bad manag-
er. In other words, as shown in this Article’s Appendix Section 
E, a board could fail to remove a manager even after observing 
two consecutive zero payoffs at the end of the medium term, 
when removing the manager would be the efficient decision to 
make.175 
D. STRONG BOARDS, STRONG SHAREHOLDERS 
The discussion in Parts IV.A and IV.B above has exposed 
the limits of both the shareholder primacy model and the board 
primacy model in implementing a regime of time-consistent 
removal decisions. Shareholder primacy, on the one hand, fails 
to address the limited commitment problem that affects share-
holders. It is therefore incapable of avoiding the risk of ineffi-
cient removal of good managers and, hence, the risk of strategic 
managerial signaling—raising serious short-termist concerns. 
Board primacy, on the other hand, reduces these concerns, but 
fails to ensure the efficient removal of bad managers—failing to 
mitigate adverse selection issues. 
Against this analytical background, this Article argues on 
behalf of a competing governance model with stronger board 
authority in the short term and enhanced shareholder govern-
ance rights—including an unconstrained power of removal—in 
the longer term. 
In the short term, stronger board authority—such as the 
authority a board is likely to gain through the adoption of de-
fensive measures—ensures that a board retains exclusive deci-
sion-making power over managerial removal decision. This 
means that the board can be assumed to exercise its decision-
making power without being exposed to shareholder retribution 
for making what may be perceived as a “wrong” decision or oth-
erwise being subject to shareholder pressure. Under these cir-
cumstances, as explained above, a board of directors will likely 
 
 175. See infra Appendix Section E (comparing different outcomes between 
beneficial and excessive board biases). 
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exhibit a bias toward tolerating the occurrence of disappointing 
firm outcomes. In contrast to what is argued by shareholders 
advocates, this bias can be expected to serve a positive function 
in light of the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff and the 
shareholders’ limited commitment problem. It does so by 
providing a commitment device against the likelihood of ineffi-
cient short-term removal decisions by the shareholders, offering 
an institutional remedy to the shareholders’ inability to credi-
bly commit to the longer-term evaluation of managerial actions 
and types.176 
In this sense, a “biased board” that is protected by short-
term market pressure provides shareholders with what philos-
opher Jon Elster refers to as a “form of rationality over time.”177 
As explained by Elster, in situations where an individual antic-
ipates that she will choose an undesirable future course of ac-
tion unless prevented from doing so, it may be in the individu-
al’s interest to adopt precautionary measures that limit her 
ability to make that choice in the future, or at least make that 
choice less likely.178 In the same way, granting the board of di-
rectors exclusive short-term authority over managerial removal 
decisions allows shareholders to achieve more than they could 
otherwise achieve if they were free to exercise their removal 
power at any time. 
In the longer term, however, on the one hand, a board’s bi-
as might grow excessive, meaning that a biased, insulated 
board is more likely to inefficiently avoid removing a bad man-
ager. On the other hand, market prices are more likely to pro-
vide reliable guidance for the efficient exercise of the share-
holders’ removal power.179 Therefore, a board’s exclusive 
 
 176. Corporations with a controlling shareholder represent an important 
exception. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 125. In general, controlling 
shareholders can more accurately assess managerial performance, as they 
tend to have better access to information, partly because they often hold board 
seats (directly or through a representative). See id. Further, controlling share-
holders are also more likely to be subject to reputational sanctions if they de-
fault on a prior commitment, especially if they serve as a firm’s directors. See 
id. This suggests the use of dual-class stock might be a viable alternative to 
the use of defensive measures to protect a firm’s commitment to long-term 
value creation. See Zoran Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and 
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565–67, 576–86 (2016) (claiming that 
entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue long-
term business visions). 
 177. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 5 (2000). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See supra Part III.B (discussing the informational limitations of stock 
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authority over managerial removal decisions should be relaxed 
in favor of greater shareholder authority. In practice, in the 
longer term a board should not be insulated from shareholder 
pressure nor the shareholders’ removal power be limited by the 
adoption of defensive measures or any procedural hurdles. 
V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
This Part presents the principal policy implications of this 
Article’s novel theory of the optimal allocation of power be-
tween boards and shareholders and suggests directions of 
change that should be taken due to these implications. It does 
so against the background of the recent changes occurring both 
in legal rules and market practices that have contributed to 
shift corporate power from boards to shareholders.180 These 
changes have rewarded the long-standing efforts of shareholder 
advocates to strengthen shareholder governance rights in the 
conviction that such a transformation would increase directori-
al and managerial accountability. 
Reexamined through this Article’s analytical perspective, 
enhanced shareholder power addresses the risk that boards in-
sulated from shareholder discipline can be inefficiently biased 
toward retaining incumbent managers. What shareholder ad-
vocates do not consider, however, is that in the short term, a 
biased, insulated board serves the very interests of sharehold-
ers, as it puts in place a commitment to time-consistent remov-
al decisions that shareholders themselves are unable to provide 
due to their limited commitment problem. 
Because of the gains made by shareholder advocates, how-
ever, today’s boards have grown less able to gain protection 
from short-term shareholder pressure. Most notably, defensive 
measures such as staggered boards and poison pills have be-
come less effective in the current corporate landscape of in-
creased shareholder activism, as activists have gained the abil-
ity to coerce boards to approve the dismissal of such defenses or 
otherwise sneak past these protections.181 The result, as out-
lined earlier, is that U.S. corporations are worryingly moving 
toward short-termist shareholder gains.182 This is consistent 
with this Article’s theoretical prediction that the ultimate cost 
 
prices in the short term). 
 180. See supra Part I.B. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 84–90. 
 182. See supra note 163. 
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of an indiscriminate extension of shareholder rights is ineffi-
cient project selection at the equilibrium, which may present a 
systematic threat to sustainable firm growth.183 To remedy this 
status of affairs, this Part outline measures designed to re-
empower boards to limit short-term shareholder interference in 
managerial accountability decisions and, more generally, the 
corporate affairs. 
On the other hand, what is missing from current defenses 
of board authority by board advocates is the recognition that 
exclusive board authority might become detrimental to firm 
and shareholder interests in the longer term, as a board’s bias 
might grow excessive.184 In response, this Part also argues that 
defensive measures should have a “finite” rather than a “per-
petual” life. This means that such measures should be designed 
so to automatically expire as a corporation’s business cycle 
transitions from the short to the long term, unless the board is 
able to secure shareholders’ approval for extending the use of 
such measures to an additional period of time. 
After discussing the directions of change counseled by this 
Article’s novel theory of board and shareholder power, this Part 
concludes with an assessment of the means through which such 
changes should be implemented. It does so by exploring the po-
tential for a coordinated private ordering response by U.S. 
boards and institutional investors, accompanied by accommo-
dating changes in the Delaware courts’ approach to the use of 
board defenses. 
A. DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
1. Short-Term and Long-Term Defined 
So far, this Article has not yet defined the line between 
short and long term. Indications coming from the real corporate 
world suggest that, as a general reference point, the short-term 
horizon should correspond to the three-year span following the 
appointment of a new CEO—a point in time that can be as-
sumed to coincide with the beginning of a new business cycle. 
 
 183. See Part II. 
 184. Even assuming that a board’s ability to commit a corporation to the 
longer-term evaluation of managerial actions rests on the informational ad-
vantage, rather than the bias, of directors, one should acknowledge that such 
advantage is likely to reduce over time, as market prices can be expected to 
more accurately reflect private managerial information. 
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Among others, this proposal is consistent with the recom-
mendations that have come from several corporate actors—
including institutional investors—to address the risk of short-
termist activist interventions. Pursuant to such recommenda-
tions, the tax code should be amended so to qualify an invest-
ment as long term—and, hence, as entitled to benefit from ad-
vantageous tax treatments—only if it lasts for a minimum 
period of three years, rather than the existing one-year peri-
od.185 A triennial term also is the common standard for board 
members serving on a staggered board.186 Further, if one con-
siders that the average CEO’s tenure is about seven years187 
and the average director tenure is about eight years,188 identify-
ing the short term with a horizon of three years seems con-
sistent with majoritarian market practices. 
There are, however, two caveats to this general indication. 
First, the three-year short-term horizon should be interpreted 
with some degree of flexibility. In fact, within the parameters 
indicated by majoritarian market practices, the determination 
of the exact extension of the short-term horizon should be left 
to individual firms, in order to avoid that a bright-line rule may 
fail to accurately reflect firm-specific circumstances. 
Second, the general principle that a board—and hence 
management—should be protected by shareholder interference 
 
 185. In a letter sent to the CEOs of 500 of the nation’s largest companies in 
April 2015, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock—currently the largest asset 
manager in the world, overseeing over four trillion dollars of investments—
expressed concerns for short-termist activist intervention, while also advanc-
ing the proposal described in the text as a possible remedy. See Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, BlackRock’s Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s To Stop Being 
So Nice to Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos 
-to-stop-being-so-nice-to-investors.html?_r=0. Similar proposals have also 
come from academics, international think tanks, institutional investors and 
even political circles. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A 
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT 3 (2009), http://assests.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/ 
content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf; Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 
163, at 10 (noting that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton advanced a pro-
posal along similar lines); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Specu-
lative Short-term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 101, 109 (1989). These recom-
mendations share the common view that amending the tax code in this way 
would introduce a beneficial form of Pigouvian taxation, deterring “hit-and-
run” activists. 
 186. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 77. 
 187. See supra note 113. 
 188. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Renewed Focus on Corporate 
Director Tenure, N.Y.L.J. (May 22, 2014). 
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for the first three years of a CEO’s tenure does not imply that 
after this initial time span, a board could no longer, for exam-
ple, adopt any defensive measures, regardless of the duration of 
its mandate. This would be inconsistent with the actuality that 
the same CEO and board members tend to develop multiple in-
vestment cycles during their tenures. After the initial three-
year term, however, a board would need to submit proposals for 
extended protection to a binding shareholder vote, substantial-
ly giving shareholders a binding “say on corporate govern-
ance.”189 This mechanism would mitigate the risk that a board 
might opportunistically exploit extended protection to camou-
flage a real failure for a longer-than-expected “early failure.” At 
the same time, it would enable a board to benefit from extended 
protection if directors can persuade shareholders that such pro-
tection serves their interests.  
Finally, as to the risk that exclusive board authority in the 
short term might prevent shareholders from promptly address-
ing cases where a manager is patently “bad” or is clearly engag-
ing in moral hazard, such a risk should not be overstated. In-
deed, the remedy of removal for cause190 and fiduciary rules 
would remain available to shareholders to respond to similar 
outrageous cases. 
2. Higher-Order Constraints and Finite Board Protection 
In the political context, constitutional constraints that re-
strain options available to a polity are often described “as ena-
bling rather than constraining, that is, as devices not only for 
limiting government, but also for facilitating the difficult pro-
cess of self-government.”191 When one applies this view to corpo-
rate governance, placing restrictions on the removal of manag-
ers in the short-term serves a constructive governance function, 
as it avoids that shareholder may rely on uninformative short-
term share prices in deciding whether or not to discipline man-
agers. 
 
 189. Granting shareholders a long-term binding say on corporate govern-
ance is consistent with recent empirical evidence documenting that “bilateral” 
defensive measures that require shareholder approval are associated with in-
creased firm value over time, while defensive measures that can be unilateral-
ly adopted by the board are associated with reduced long-term firm value. See 
Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 732–34. 
 190. See supra note 50. 
 191. See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 633, 635, 639–42 (1991) (discussing the benefits of constitutional provi-
sions excluding the right to secede). 
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Political theory, however, also points out that commitment 
strategies work only as long as they are embedded in further 
restrictions.192 For what makes a commitment credible, is the 
level of difficulty encountered in reneging on that commitment 
ex post.193 Thus, without the adoption of higher-level con-
straints that can prevent subsequent changes to the “rules of 
the game,” first-level constraints risk being exposed to the 
same commitment issues that prompted their adoption in their 
first place. For example, Article V of the U.S. Constitution194—
which subject amendments to the Constitution to the approval 
of two-thirds of both houses—supplies the means by which con-
stitutional constraints are made meaningful.195 
In the corporate context, the use of defensive measures 
such as staggered boards and poison pills have historically pro-
vided the higher-order constraints to safeguard board authority 
against the threat of short-term shareholder interference196 
and, with it, the board’s commitment function.197 With the 
emergence of the shareholder empowerment movement, how-
 
 192. See ELSTER, supra note 177, at 117–18 (explaining that in order to be 
effective, “precommitment . . . needs to be protected from interference by the 
current majority”). 
 193. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: 
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
517 (2003). 
 194. U.S. CONST art. V. 
 195. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 134–77 (1995) (de-
fending supermajority rules as a means to enable ordinary politics). 
 196. Until the rise of the hostile takeover in the 1980s, which gave share-
holders the ability to remove incumbents through the simple exercise of stock 
market purchasing power, the likelihood that shareholders could challenge 
board authority was non-existent. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Eco-
nomic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1520–21 (1989). Indeed, under the traditional collective action problems 
of dispersed investors and the costs raised by the proxy machinery for chal-
lengers before the SEC amendments, shareholders had limited ability to exer-
cise their power of removal even upon the realization of disappointing firm 
outcomes. See Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 772–75 (providing empirical 
evidence). From this perspective, the introduction of defensive measures can 
be thought of as a new form of higher-order constraint that replaced the in-
herent constraint provided by the absolute insulation of U.S. boards before the 
1980s. 
 197. Other corporate law scholars have explored the idea that the use of 
defensive measures may serve as a (pre-)commitment device. These scholars, 
however, have restricted their attention to the benefits that defensive 
measures may deliver during a takeover context by increasing a board’s bar-
gaining power and thus shareholders’ expected returns. See Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 193, at 484 & n.32 (quoting other studies discussing the benefits of 
enhanced board power within the takeover context). 
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ever, these defenses have grown increasingly less effective as 
higher-order constraints. In response, similar to the functions 
served by supermajority requirements in the constitutional 
context, this Article suggests that a charter provision requiring 
the approval of a supermajority—two-thirds or more—of the 
shareholders for the dismissal of defensive tactics would be 
beneficial. This provision would help restore the effectiveness of 
defensive tactics against activist interventions and, with it, the 
“security of expectations”198 such measures provide as higher-
order constraints protecting a board’s commitment function. On 
the other hand, in order not to jeopardize the efficient exercise 
of shareholder discipline in the longer term, a board’s defenses 
should be designed to have a finite three-year life unless share-
holders approve their extension for a subsequent period. 
Illustrating how these changes would redefine the way in 
which poison pills and staggered boards are designed is useful 
to add concreteness to this policy proposal. In the case of poison 
pills, a board can unilaterally adopt “on the shelf” (i.e., inactive 
but ready to use) pills for use at any time if a threat materializ-
es.199 This raises concerns that directors might be granted time-
inconsistent protection through a pill as a board might use this 
defense opportunistically to gain potentially perpetual protec-
tion from shareholder discipline. In order to address this risk, 
changes should be introduced in the way pills are drafted so to 
provide for the adoption of pills with a finite life of three years. 
During this period, a pill should be removable only upon 
the approval by two-thirds (or more) of the firm’s shareholders 
in addition to board’s approval. This would help mitigate the 
additional risk that a pill’s protection might be ineffective faced 
with the ability acquired by activists to coerce the board’s ap-
proval of the dismissal of a pill. After this three-year period, the 
pill should automatically expire, unless it is removed earlier 
through a supermajority vote or the board is able to secure 
shareholder approval to extend the pill’s use for a further peri-
od. Unlike in the case of an active pill adopted for longer peri-
ods or on the shelf pills without a time limit, this mechanism 
would mitigate the risk that a board could opportunistically ex-
ploit the pill for undue longer-term protection. 
 
 198. Cf. MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND 
LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE 9 (2014) (noting that modern supermajority 
rules are primarily regarded as a means to protect a polity’s institutional sta-
bility). 
 199. See Gill et al., supra note 89, at 169–70. 
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In the case of a staggered board, the provision of a 
supemajority requirement would also ensure that proposals to 
destagger the board receive overwhelming approval by the 
shareholders in addition to receiving board approval.200 Similar 
to the case of poison pills, this feature would be useful to neu-
tralize the increased ability of activists to coerce board approval 
to destaggering. Consistent with this theoretical prediction, the 
evidence on precatory activist proposals to destagger the board 
indicates that while these proposals are generally successful, 
they tend to fail when a corporation has adopted a supermajori-
ty requirement for board destaggering.201 
As to the tools designed to ensure that a staggered board 
has a finite rather than perpetual life, some additional clarifi-
cations are in order. First, unlike a poison pill, the adoption of a 
staggered board generally requires shareholder approval.202 
This is an important difference as it enables shareholders to ve-
to the adoption of a staggered board should they deem this ar-
rangement detrimental to their interest. Second, unlike the po-
tentially perpetual protection provided by a pill, a staggered 
board provides each class of directors with protection for a lim-
ited period of three years. Third, absent a supermajority re-
quirement and the simultaneous presence of a pill, a staggered 
board only delays but does not impede the exercise of voting 
control.203 Considering these specific features of staggered 
boards, this Article argues that under the regime it proposes, it 
would be sufficient to provide for the automatic expiration of 
the supermajority requirement for destaggering, rather than 
that of the staggered board itself, after the three-year short-
term period.204 
 
 200. This proposal would be politically feasible as some U.S. states have 
already adopted a similar regime for the removal of staggered boards. See, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2016). 
 201. See generally S’HOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
PROJECT 2012 REPORT (2012), http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP 
-2012-Annual-Report.pdf (providing evidence on the precatory proposals filed 
by the activist investors that were represented by the Harvard Shareholder 
Rights Project). 
 202. In Delaware, and most other states, shareholder approval is required 
to adopt a staggered board after the initial charter or bylaws are in place. See, 
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016). The notable exception is Maryland, 
where the board has unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 (West 2016). 
 203. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 58, at 903–04 (discussing the limited 
deterrent effect of a staggered board before the pill’s invention). 
 204. As an alternative to achieve the same result, the current annual elec-
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Further, following the same logic underpinning the pro-
posed introduction of supermajority requirements for the dis-
missal of board defenses, an additional beneficial measure 
would be a corporation’s statutory choice to opt for plurality 
voting rather than majority voting in the election of board 
members. As discussed earlier, majority voting is one of the 
most potent weapons in the arsenal of activists’ governance 
levers.205 And activists have increasingly used majority voting 
to threaten engaging in withholding campaigns against incum-
bents in order to obtain desired governance changes including 
the removal of board defenses.206 Moving back to a regime of 
plurality voting would thus help expropriate activists of this 
powerful bargaining lever, correspondingly reinforcing the ef-
fectiveness of board defenses as higher-order constraints. Yet, 
in order to avoid the risk that moving back to this regime helps 
a board to gain perpetual protection, plurality voting should al-
so be designed to have a finite life of three years. This means 
that after this period, plurality voting should automatically be 
replaced by majority voting unless the board can gain share-
holder approval to extend the use of plurality voting to an addi-
tional period of time. 
B. MEANS OF CHANGE 
The above discussion has illustrated the directions and the 
tools that would help to transition to a regime of time-
consistent removal decisions. However, it has not addressed the 
question of how the proposed changes should be implemented. 
 
tion default of board members could be replaced by a triennial election default. 
Such a proposal has been advanced by corporate scholars and shares motiva-
tions of time-consistency in the evaluation of managerial actions that are simi-
lar to those exposed in this Article. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., The Great 
Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2002) (proposing triennial board elections); Martin Lipton 
& Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The 
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225–30 (1991) 
(proposing quinquennial board elections). Further, pluriennal board terms are 
also the norm in several foreign jurisdictions. See Enriques et al., supra note 
50, at 61. However, a triennial board term would arguably be less politically 
feasible than this Article’s proposal for a supermajority requirement for 
destaggering as it would require a modification of state legislation on top of 
other hurdles. 
 205. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 206. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common 
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More 
Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 11–12 (2007). 
  
1440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1377 
 
Theoretically, statutory implementation of these changes 
could be the most effective solution. In practice, however, the 
political hurdles affecting this route make it most likely unfea-
sible.207 Further, a similar reform intervention could end up 
forcing an unnecessary one-size-fits-all approach. This Article 
thus submits that a private ordering response, accompanied by 
accommodating changes in the Delaware courts’ approach to 
the use of board defenses, would be the most feasible route to 
improve corporate governance practices. 
An immediate objection to this claim is the classic 
“Panglossian argument” under which the market is assumed to 
always move in the direction of efficient outcomes.208 Thus, if 
the governance arrangements this Article advocates really ben-
efitted non-arbitrageur shareholders, one should already ob-
serve these arrangements in the real corporate world or, at 
least, some attempts at reforming corporate governance prac-
tices along those lines. 
To the point, it is noteworthy that there have been recent 
signs that a demand for recalibrating corporate governance ar-
rangements toward a time-consistent direction seems to be 
emerging among heavyweight shareholders such as institu-
tional investors. Breaking old patterns at various times during 
2015, major institutional investors issued statements that they 
would support the long-term plans of companies against activ-
ist attacks, and they would withhold support of activists who 
primarily seek to force companies into share buybacks and ex-
traordinary distributions.209 Institutional investors also seem to 
 
 207. For the statutory implementation of this Article’s proposed changes to 
be effective, the laws of each state should be consistently amended. Otherwise, 
reincorporation into another state could provide an easy way to escape the 
new set of rules. Further, in the specific case of Delaware, one should also lob-
by for mandatory solutions. Otherwise, because Delaware law is structured 
such that it mostly provides defaults, corporations could easily opt out of the 
new rules. This route would not only be more politically complicated, but also 
likely undesirable from a broader efficiency perspective. Last, successfully lob-
bying Congress to introduce changes at the federal level would be even harder. 
 208. See Bebchuk, supra note 53, at 888. Panglossian claims, however, 
have been criticized as reflecting an overly optimistic view of market achieve-
ments. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrange-
ments, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 728 (2003). 
 209. See Sorkin, supra note 185 (discussing the short-termist concerns ex-
pressed by Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock). Statements of similar tone and 
content have also recently come from F. William McNabb III, Chairman and 
CEO of Vanguard, another of the biggest players in the institutional investor 
landscape, and Anne Simpson, director of corporate governance and a senior 
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be following through on their statements about protecting in-
cumbent boards from short-termist activist interventions as 
they have begun to vote against these interventions and in fa-
vor of incumbents.210 
These recent events add concreteness to this Article’s call 
for a private ordering solution to reform corporate governance 
practices, indicating that such a solution could be cooperatively 
carried out by U.S. boards and institutional investors. Im-
portantly, under this solution, this Article’s proposed changes 
should be interpreted as exemplificative, rather than exhaus-
tive, as the specific configuration of a corporation’s time-
consistent defenses, the exact determination of both short-term 
versus long-term horizons, as well as the mechanisms of finite 
duration of a board’s defenses would be ultimately left to these 
parties’ contracting. A private ordering response of this kind al-
so seems consistent with the statements soliciting increased co-
operation with U.S. CEOs and boards of directors that have 
come from institutional investors and prominent corporate 
lawyers during the past year and a half.211 
In addition to being politically feasible, this solution would 
offer the advantage of empowering market actors with the nec-
essary freedom to devise fine-tuned arrangements that can ca-
ter to the specific needs of individual corporations. Neverthe-
less, it would face two potential challenges. The first is the still 
dominant idea in the U.S. legal academy that what needs to be 
done to recalibrate the system cannot involve “insulating man-
agement[] from shareholder accountability.”212 This view is 
largely a product of the vilification of board insulation brought 
about by shareholder advocates and proxy advisors213 on the as-
sumption that any form of incumbent protection from removal 
is merely a reflection of managerial moral hazard. However, as 
 
portfolio manager of CalPERS, the nation’s largest pension fund by assets. See 
Lipton et al., supra note 163. 
 210. Most notably, in May 2015, Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard 
sided with DuPont in its proxy fight against activist hedge fund Trian Fund, 
offering the company decisive support. See Justin Lahart, Why Peltz Didn’t 
Have Icahn’s Apple Touch, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2015, at B14. 
 211. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 3, 2016), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/03/the-new-paradigm-for-corporate 
-governance. 
 212. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 163, at 85. 
 213. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? 
A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate 
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2014). 
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this Article has demonstrated, this assumption is grounded on 
a theoretically incomplete account of the information problems 
imbuing the shareholder-manager relationship and should thus 
be discarded. 
The second challenge is whether enhancing the force of 
current defensive measures would raise issues under the com-
mon law of Delaware as the state where most U.S. corporations 
are incorporated. Under the Unocal standards applied by Del-
aware courts, these measures need to be both reasonable re-
sponses to a cognizable threat214 and proportional to such a 
threat, meaning that the defensive action cannot be “draconian, 
by being either preclusive or coercive.”215 Further, if a defensive 
tactic has the “primary purpose” of interfering with or imped-
ing the effective exercise of a shareholder vote,216 it is also re-
quired per Blasius to have a “compelling justification.”217 
Under Unocal, a first potential problem could be repre-
sented by the fact that this Article’s policy proposal conceives of 
a board’s defenses more as prospective than as responsive to a 
current threat. However, under the broad interpretation that 
has been given to Unocal’s reasonableness test, this concern 
does not seem particularly severe. First, Delaware courts have 
in general validated the use of prospective defensive tactics.218 
Further, as made evident most recently in the 2014 case of 
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, the threat of “creeping control” 
(or “negative control”)—the ability to exercise disproportionate 
influence over major corporate decisions—is sufficient to consti-
 
 214. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 
1985). This first prong of the Unocal standard “is essentially a process-based 
review,” requiring directors to demonstrate that they acted in good faith and 
after a reasonable investigation of the threat. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Air-
gas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 215. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). A de-
fense is coercive if it is “aimed at ‘cramming down’ on [the] shareholders a 
management-sponsored alternative.” Id. at 1387. A defense is preclusive when 
success in a pending proxy contest is “realistically unattainable.” Selectica, 
Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *20 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 26, 2010), aff ’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010). 
 216. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch. 
1985) (“Directors who have the responsibility for the governance of the corpo-
ration are entitled to formulate a takeover policy, whether it be to meet a spe-
cific threat or a general prospective one.”). 
  
2017] BOARD AND SHAREHOLDER POWER 1443 
 
tute a cognizable threat justifying the adoption of a defensive 
measure.219 
Whether this Article’s proposal for strong but finite defen-
sive tactics could fail Unocal’s proportionality test is more un-
certain. While in principle it should not,220 in practice one can-
not exclude that the specific combination and features of the 
defenses a corporation could use might trigger this test. In re-
sponse, this Article defends a modification of the triggering el-
ements of Unocal’s proportionality test under which the focus of 
judicial review should shift to whether a defense is finite or 
perpetual. This does not mean that a defense that has been in 
place longer than three years (or the alternative period of time 
a company might have selected for short-term board protection) 
should automatically be found draconian, especially because a 
board might have gained shareholders’ consent for extended 
protection. It means instead that under this circumstance, the 
court should then move to verify whether the defense is either 
coercive or preclusive. Conversely, a defense that has been in 
place for less than three years (or the alternative period of time 
a company might have selected for short-term board protection) 
should automatically pass the proportionality test without the 
need for a further inquiry into whether the defense is draconi-
an. 
Last, Delaware courts are unlikely to evaluate this Arti-
cle’s proposed changes under Blasius’s “compelling justifica-
tion” test as its application has been narrowed. In particular, as 
made more evident in recent cases involving activist attacks—
which are the focus of this Article’s policy proposal—the courts 
clarified that poison pills (i.e., the defense potentially more 
likely to trigger the Blasius test) will almost always be assessed 
 
 219. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014); see 
also supra note 90 (discussing the facts of Third Point). It is also worth em-
phasizing that the court found the intervention by the activist hedge fund 
Third Point to involve creeping control even if the fund held less than 20% 
ownership and was not granted any express veto rights. Id. 
 220. The combined adoption of a staggered board and a supermajority re-
quirement for destaggering, for example, neither contains coercive features 
that have an effect on how shareholder votes are cast nor makes the likelihood 
of success in a proxy contest “realistically unattainable.” See supra note 215. 
Similarly, the adoption of a pill does not by itself trigger the preclusivity 
standard, as established by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2010 in Selectica, 
2010 WL 703062, at *21. 
  
1444 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1377 
 
under the Unocal standard even when they do impact the 
shareholder vote.221 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has demonstrated that the persistent debate 
over the division of power between boards and shareholders has 
been too narrowly framed. For too long that debate has pro-
ceeded on the shared assumptions that moral hazard is the in-
formation problem to be addressed in the corporate context. 
Despite adverse selection having long come to play a central 
role in information economics as perhaps the most pervasive 
information problem,222 no attention has been paid to it in the 
context of the shareholder-manager relationship.  
Exploring adverse selection in this context is not just about 
academic rigor but rather involves issues of descriptive com-
plexity that bear crucial normative implications. As this Article 
has shown, once one incorporates both issues of adverse selec-
tion and managerial moral hazard, a governance model with 
stronger board authority in the short term and enhanced 
shareholders’ rights in the longer term emerges as normatively 
more desirable than either the traditional board-centric model 
or the competing shareholder primacy model of the corporation. 
On the one hand, shareholder advocates fail to recognize 
that granting the board of directors exclusive authority in the 
short term provides a beneficial commitment to “time-
consistent” removal decisions, which shareholders are other-
wise unable to ensure in light of adverse selection and unin-
formative short-term prices. Market prices may be uninforma-
tive in the short term when a firm’s investments in specific 
long-term projects, such as investments in innovation or other 
intangibles, make prices unable to fully capture the implica-
tions of managerial private information until those implications 
begin to show up in cash flows over time. Under this possibil-
ity—which is especially severe today as intangibles have come 
to represent the bulk of corporate production—economic theory 
predicts that shareholders would benefit from committing to 
 
 221. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *22 (holding that the trigger will be 
deemed reasonable and will not be deemed to thwart the shareholder fran-
chise as long as a shareholder with an ownership stake up to the trigger level 
can effectively run a proxy contest). 
 222. See supra note 104. 
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evaluate managerial decisions in the longer term when prices 
are more likely to be fully informative. 
Yet, faced with adverse selection—the risk of hiring a “bad 
manager” who does not respond to incentives for optimal pro-
ject selection—shareholders are unable to credibly commit to 
time-consistent removal decisions. Conversely, because of the 
higher likelihood that bad managers might be associated with 
disappointing firm outcomes and the risk of false matching, 
shareholders will rationally react to a low short-term firm out-
come by exercising their power of removing incumbents alt-
hough that outcome might in fact be a reflection of uninforma-
tive short-term prices. In response, good managers struggling 
to avoid removal are likely as well to become unresponsive to 
incentives for optimal project selection and engage in “strategic 
signaling,” developing a preference for short-termist projects 
that can improve the shareholders’ perception of their type. 
This analytical framework not only exposes short-termism 
as a much more pervasive problem than recognized by share-
holder advocates, but it also reframes board protection as a cor-
rective that mitigates such a problem by “exploiting” a board’s 
bias toward retaining incumbent management. In light of this 
bias, a board that is insulated from shareholder discipline—and 
hence holds exclusive decision-making power on managerial 
removal decisions—reduces the risk of the inefficient removal 
of good managers and, hence, short-termism. At the same time, 
however, board protection might jeopardize optimal project se-
lection if it becomes perpetual. Indeed, as a biased board is less 
likely to remove a good manager in the short term, so it is less 
likely to remove a bad manager in the longer term when re-
moval would be the efficient decision to make. 
Accordingly, this Article questions the recent rise of share-
holder empowerment under which boards of directors have 
grown increasingly less able to gain protection from short-term 
shareholder pressure. Mainly, this outcome is due to the de-
creased effectiveness of defensive measures such as staggered 
boards and poison pills, as hedge funds and other activists have 
gained the ability to coerce board approval to dismiss these de-
fenses or otherwise sneak past them. Unsurprisingly—but not 
less worrisome—the result of these transformative changes is 
that corporate America is moving away from long-term value 
creation and toward short-term consumption. 
To reverse this trend, and at the same time preserve the 
long-term benefits of shareholder empowerment, a coordinated 
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private ordering response by institutional investors and U.S. 
boards of directors would be the most politically feasible option. 
This response would include reinstating the limitations to 
short-term shareholder interference and transforming them in-
to meaningful high-order constraints while also ensuring that 
these limitations have a finite, rather than perpetual, life. This 
Article has outlined broad strokes of how to implement such so-
lutions. However, the greatest advantage of opting for a private 
ordering response would be enabling market actors to devise 
fine-tuned solutions that can cater to the specific needs of indi-
vidual corporations. 
  APPENDIX   
This Appendix offers an extended numerical version of the 
qualitative illustration this Article introduces in Part II.A and 
then uses throughout the discussion. This extended example 
draws more heavily on contract theory in order to simultane-
ously consider the problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion to which shareholders are exposed and, thereby, better 
elucidate the related tradeoff as well as its implications for the 
optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. 
A. SETTING AND MAIN ASSUMPTIONS 
The example’s setting and assumptions are the same as 
those of the illustration introduced in Part II although the 
temporal horizon is that of the modified version of the illustra-
tion discussed in Part IV.A with three periods: the short term, 
the medium term, and the long term (at the end of which the 
company is liquidated). For convenience, Appendix Figure 1 
provides a summary description of the projects considered by 
the example. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Projects’ Description223 
As shown by Appendix Figure 1, the numerical example at-
tributes a value of twelve to the private benefit a Good Manag-
er is expected to receive when she undertakes the Regular Pro-
ject rather than the Innovative Project.224 It also assumes that a 
Bad Manager can extract a private benefit of 200 when pursu-
ing the Bad Project, attempting to capture the fact that the use 
of reward mechanisms is unhelpful in the case of adverse selec-
tion, either because bad types fail to respond to incentives or 
designing an incentive-compatible contract is too onerous for 
the principal.225 Further, the example makes the additional 
standard assumptions that (i) both shareholders and managers 
are risk neutral agents and do not discount future gains; (ii) a 
manager’s reservation utility, regardless of her type, is zero; 
and (iii) managers are protected by limited liability. 
 
 223. As clearly shown by Figure 1, because each project delivers the same 
payoff across the three periods, although with different probabilities, the 
shareholders can at best have an inference of the manager’s type and actions 
but cannot verify either one. Further, it is also worth emphasizing that under 
the assumption of risk neutrality, the shareholders are indifferent to receiving 
a payoff of 250 with probability 40% or a payoff of 100 with certainty. Howev-
er, if the shareholders received 100 with certainty in the long term (rather 
than 250 with a 40% probability), they could easily infer that the manager un-
dertook the Regular Project rather than the Innovative Project (which delivers 
250 with certainty in the final term). This, however, would contradict the 
standard assumption that shareholders cannot observe what projects manag-
ers undertake. 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 225. See supra Part III.B. It is worth emphasizing that the private benefit 
a Bad Manager extracts from the Bad Project could be even zero if the manag-
er does not respond to incentives for type-related reasons. 
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B. INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
For convenience, in using this expanded numerical exam-
ple to elucidate the consequences that the combination of moral 
hazard and adverse selection issues produces for the share-
holders’ optimization problem, let us begin by assuming that 
the manager population only includes Good Managers. Under 
this assumption, a prospective manager’s incentive compatibil-
ity constraint will be satisfied under a compensation contract 
that grants the manager a 12% equity stake226 as this compen-
sation scheme makes it individually efficient for the manager to 
pursue the Innovative Project. Condition 1 below quantifies 
this circumstance: 
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×100+1×250) ≥ 
0.12×(1×100+1×100+0.4×250)+12 (1) 
where the left-hand side of Condition (1) represents the man-
ager’s expected payoff from pursuing the Innovative Project 
(49.2) and the right-hand side represents her expected payoff 
from pursuing the Regular Project (48) under the 12% equity-
stake plan. Under this circumstance, the shareholders’ ex-
pected payoff is then equal to 0.88×410=360.8. 
However, once one moves to incorporate adverse selection 
into the shareholders’ optimization problem, offering a prospec-
tive manager the above compensation contract no longer en-
sures the shareholders that the manager will undertake the 
Innovative Project. This is because in a world where sharehold-
ers lack viable mechanisms to separate managerial types ex 
ante,227 the shareholders will only hire a Good Manager with an 
80% probability. With the remaining 20% probability, they will, 
instead, hire a Bad Manager. This possibility, in turn, reduces 
the shareholders’ expected payoff from the venture from 360.8 
to 292.2,228 where the reduction in expected payoff arises be-
cause inducing a Bad Manager to behave is too costly (or oth-
erwise unfeasible) for the shareholders.229 
 
 226. The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint would also be satis-
fied by an 11% equity stake, but selecting a compensation plan with a 12% eq-
uity stake helps keep the computations more manageable. 
 227. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 228. The shareholders’ expected payoff in an economy including both Good 
and Bad Managers is calculated as follows: 
0.88×[0.8×(0.8×100+0.8×100+250)+0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×100)]=292.2. 
 229. In theory, the shareholders could raise monetary incentives to make 
the contract incentive compatible also for the Bad Manager; however, doing so 
is likely to be unprofitable to the shareholders. See supra Part II.C.2. Indeed, 
in order to make the undertaking of the Innovative Project individually re-
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C. SHORT-TERM REMOVAL AND STRATEGIC SIGNALING 
Let us now assume that the shareholders can also remove 
the manager at the end of the short term as it increasingly 
tends to be the case in the current corporate scenario with em-
powered shareholders. For simplicity, the example also as-
sumes that the manager’s removal is followed by the company’s 
(anticipated) liquidation.230 Last, it also poses that removing the 
manager yields shareholders a legacy value of 160 (i.e., eighty 
for each hypothetical remaining period),231 consistent with the 
assumption that the shareholders’ power of removal helps to 
reduce the cost they bear for the hire of a Bad Manager. 
Under these assumptions, upon observing a payoff of 100 
at the end of the short term, the shareholders will then apply 
the Bayes’ Rule and update their belief on the manager’s type 
so to deem that the manager is Good with a 97% probability 
(i.e., (0.8×0.8)/(0.8×0.8+0.2×0.1)=0.97). Under this belief, they 
will not remove the manager as their expected continuation 
payoff (i.e., the overall payoff the shareholders obtain from 
keeping the manager until the long term)232 is equal to 281.9,233 
which is higher than the legacy value of 160.  
Conversely, when the shareholders observe a zero payoff at 
the end of the short term (which may only come from either the 
Innovative Project or the Bad Project), they will believe there is 
only a 47.1% ((0.8×0.2)/[(0.8×0.2)+(0.2×0.9)]=0.471) chance they 
are dealing with a Good Manager. Under this posterior, their 
 
warding for the Bad Manager, the shareholders should promise her a compen-
sation percentage (comp. %) that solves the following incentive compatibility 
constraint: (comp. %)×(410)≥(comp. %)×(20)+200, which delivers a compensa-
tion percent of around 51.3%. 
 230. In actuality, removal of incumbents will typically be followed by the 
appointment of new management, but the assumption of liquidation causes no 
loss of generality in our example. 
 231. A payoff of eighty per period approximates what the shareholders ex-
pect to receive in an economy including both Good Managers and Bad Manag-
ers if they provide no equity incentives to the manager and have no removal 
right. Since under these circumstances a Good Manager would always pursue 
the Regular Project, the shareholder’s expected value would be computed as 
follows: [(0.8×300)+(0.2×20)]/3=81.3. 
 232. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff is the pooling price at 
which the company stock is traded. As explained in the text, the pooling price 
can be high or low depending on whether the investors observe a payoff of 100 
or zero at the end of the short term. 
 233. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they 
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 97% is determined as fol-
lows: 0.88×[0.97×(0.8×100+250)+0.03×(0.1×100)]=281.9. 
  
1450 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1377 
 
continuation payoff reduces to 141.3,234 so they will rationally 
decide to remove the manager. 
A Good Manager, however, will anticipate that she will 
continue to be employed only if the shareholders observe 100 at 
the end of the short term. This will occur with probability 80% 
when the manager chooses the Innovative Project while it will 
occur with certainty if she chooses the safer Regular Project. It 
is then easy to see that when the shareholders can remove the 
manager in the short term, the incentives the Good Manager 
develops for strategic signaling will make pursuing the Innova-
tive Project no longer profitable to her under the 12% equity 
plan. Indeed, when a Good Manager is exposed to the risk of 
losing her continuation value (i.e., the payoffs from future em-
ployment periods), her incentive compatibility constraint no 
longer holds, as shown by Condition (2): 
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250) < 
0.12×(100+100+0.4×250)+12 (2)  
where the left-hand side of Condition (2) represents the man-
ager’s expected payoff from pursuing the Innovative Project 
(41.3) and the right-hand side represents the manager’s payoff 
from pursuing the Regular Project (48). 
Condition (2) then clearly shows that the higher expected 
cost the manager bears for the risk of losing her continuation 
value under the Innovative Project (relative to the Regular Pro-
ject) outweighs the value of the reward she receives when she 
undertakes that project.235  
 
 234. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they 
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 47.1% is determined as fol-
lows: 0.88×[0.471×(0.8×100+250)+0.529×(0.1×100)]=141.4. 
 235. Choosing the Regular Project is the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
for the Good Manager when she is exposed to the threat of short-term remov-
al. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 320–24 
(1991) (explaining Perfect Bayesian equilibrium). Under these circumstances, 
the shareholders’ expected payoff reduces to 241.9. This amount is calculated 
as follows:  
0.88×[0.8×(100+100+0.4×250)+0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100)] 
+(0.2×0.9×160)=241.9,  
where (0.2×0.9×160) is the payoff the shareholders expect to receive when they 
fire a Bad Manager at the end of the short term with 0.2 being the proportion 
of Bad Managers, 0.9 being the probability that a Bad Manager taking the 
Bad Project generates zero payoff at the end of the short term, and 160 being 
the shareholders’ legacy value. It is also worth emphasizing that if one relaxes 
the example’s assumption that the manager is risk-neutral and assumes that 
she is risk-averse (as might be the case), the manager will have even greater 
incentives to engage in strategic signaling. 
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In order for the manager’s equity compensation plan to 
continue to be incentive-compatible when the shareholders can 
remove the manager at the end of the short term, the share-
holders should increase the manager’s equity stake to 28%.236 
Such an increase, however, would make the pursuing of the In-
novative Project no longer profitable to the shareholders. Under 
the circumstances the shareholders would only expect to re-
ceive 254.1,237 which is less than the 292.2 they expect to re-
ceive when they have no removal power and are thus fully ex-
posed to the problem of adverse selection.238 
 
 236. A compensation plan granting the manager a 28% equity stake satis-
fies the following incentive compatibility constraint: 
0.28×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250) ≥ 0.28×(100+100+0.4×250)+12. 
This means that in order for the Good Manager to have the right incentives to 
undertake the Innovative Project when the shareholders have the right to re-
move her in the short term, the manager should receive 96.3. 
 237. Under a compensation plan granting the manager a 28% equity stake, 
the shareholders expect to receive the following: 
0.72×[0.8×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250)+ 
0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100)]+(0.8×0.2×160)+(0.2×0.9×160)=254.1, 
where (0.8×0.2×160) is the payoff the shareholders expect to receive when they 
fire a Good Manager at the end of the short term, with 0.8 being the propor-
tion of Good Managers, 0.2 being the probability that a Good Manager taking 
the Innovative Project generates zero payoff at the end of the short term, and 
160 being the shareholders’ legacy value. Similarly, (0.2×0.9×160) is the payoff 
the shareholders expect to receive when they fire a Bad Manager at the end of 
the short term. 
 238. The amount the shareholders expect to receive under the attribution 
of a 28% equity stake to the manager, 254.1, is also lower than the amount 
they could obtain without any equity incentives, but they would retain the op-
tion of firing the manager at the end of the short term, i.e., 271. Because with-
out equity incentives the good manager would always take the Regular Pro-
ject, the shareholders expect to receive the following: 
1×[0.8×(1×100+1×100+0.4×250)+0.2× 
(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100+0×250)]+(0.2×0.9×160)=271. 
Note that this amount is also higher than what the shareholders expect to re-
ceive when they have the right to remove the manager at the end of the short-
term under the original 12% equity plan, i.e., 241.9. See equation supra note 
235. This suggests that the use of incentives when the shareholders are em-
powered to short-term removal grants the manager a pure rent, as these in-
centives cannot induce optimal project selection. In the jargon of shareholder 
advocates, this would be “pay-without-performance.” See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text. What these advocates do not see, however, is that a share-
holders’ removal power that can be exercised at any time, including the near 
term, is the cause, not the solution, to this problem. 
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D. THE VALUE OF TIME-CONSISTENT REMOVAL 
Let us now consider the case in which the shareholders 
cannot remove the manager until the end of the medium-
term—as it would occur under this Article’s proposal for the 
adoption of a time-consistent removal regime. Similar to the 
representation of short-term removal in Appendix Section C, 
the example poses that removing the manager yields the 
shareholders a legacy value of eighty; incorporating the benefit 
removal delivers as an ex post remedy against adverse selec-
tion.239 
In this case, the shareholders will be able to rely on the ob-
servation of a stream of payoffs (as well as the observation of 
these payoffs’ order) rather than just one payoff to derive an in-
ference on the manager’s type. Analytically, this means that 
they will apply the Bayes’ Rule sequentially in order to update 
their beliefs on the manager’s type so that the shareholders’ 
posteriors after observing any possible combination of payoffs 
yielded in the short- and medium-term will be the following: 
(i) Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100 & 100] = 
(0.97×0.8)/(0.97×0.8+0.03×0.1)=0.998. This posterior 
is computed by updating the previous posterior of 
97% after observing 100 at the end of the short 
term; 
(ii) Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 0 & 0] = 
(0.471×0.2)/(0.471×0.2+0.529×0.9)=0.165. This pos-
terior is computed by updating the previous posteri-
or 47.1% after observing 0 at the end of the short 
term; 
(iii) Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100 & 0] = 
(0.97×0.2)/(0.97×0.2+0.03×0.9)=0.877. This posterior 
is computed by updating the previous posterior of 
97% after observing 100 at the end of the medium 
term; 
(iv) Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 0 & 100] = 
(0.471×0.8)/(0.471×0.2+0.529×0.1)=0.877. This pos-
terior is computed by updating the previous posteri-
or of 47.1% after observing 0 at the end of the medi-
um term. 
Like in the short-term removal case, the shareholders’ pos-
sible removal decisions are assessed by comparing the continu-
 
 239. The legacy value when the shareholders have a medium-term removal 
right reduces from 160 to 80 as there is only one remaining period (i.e., the 
long term). See supra note 231. 
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ation value the shareholders obtain by keeping the manager for 
the long term to the legacy value of eighty they obtain by firing 
the manager in the medium term. Under the above posterior 
beliefs, it is then easy to see that the shareholders will fire the 
manager only when they observe two consecutive zero payoffs. 
This is so because only upon the observation of these realiza-
tions, the continuation value accruing to the shareholders is 
lower than the legacy value of eighty (i.e., 0.88×(0.165 
×250)<80).240 Consistent with the result that over time prices 
tend to be more informative about managerial types, it is like-
wise easy to see that the probability the shareholders will cor-
rectly fire a Bad Manager increases over time. Indeed, the 
probability that a Bad Manager will produce two consecutive 
zero payoffs in the medium term—and hence will be correctly 
fired—is 0.9×0.9=0.81. Conversely, that probability is 
0.2×0.2=0.04 for a Good Manager, meaning that the probability 
shareholders may mistakenly fire a Good Manager reduces to 
4% under a time-consistent removal regime. 
Correspondingly, the example shows that such a regime 
avoids interfering with a Good Manager’s incentives to select 
the Innovative Project as a Good Manager anticipates that 
there is a much lower probability that she will be fired if she 
chooses the Innovative Project under a time-consistent removal 
regime. Indeed, once this circumstance is incorporated into the 
manager’s incentive compatibility constraint, this constraint 
changes as follows (relative to the case of short-term removal 
shown under Condition (2)): 
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×100+0.96×250) ≥ 
0.12×(100+100+0.4×250)+12 (3) 
where the left-hand side of Condition (3) represents the Good 
Manager’s expected payoff from undertaking the Innovative 
Project and the right-hand side represents her expected payoff 
from undertaking the Regular Project. As the left-hand side 
and the right-hand side of Condition (3) yields the same result, 
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, meaning that 
the manager will select the Innovative Project.241 
 
 240. It is also easy to verify that for all the other cases, the continuation 
value the shareholders obtain by retaining the manager is higher than 80. 
 241. In contract theory, when the incentive compatibility constraint is 
binding (i.e., the values are the same), it is standard to assume that an agent 
will behave (i.e., she will take the action preferred by the principal). See 
TIROLE, supra note 23, at 118. 
  
1454 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1377 
 
Last, because of the reduced likelihood of strategic signal-
ing, the benefits shareholders expect to obtain for constraining 
adverse selection through the exercise of removal outweighs the 
cost they bear for the risk of short-termism. On the one hand, 
the expected loss to shareholders for mistakenly firing a Good 
Manager under this modified removal regime is reduced to 4%, 
implying that shareholders bear a corresponding 4% probabil-
ity of losing the difference between what they would get by re-
taining a Good Manager in the long term and the eighty legacy 
value. After this probability is weighted for the population of 
Good Managers (80%), the expected cost to shareholders for 
mistakenly firing a Good Manager is thus 4.5.242 This loss, how-
ever, is more than compensated by what the shareholders ex-
pect to gain from the increased 81% probability of correctly fir-
ing a Bad Manager, implying that the shareholders have a 
corresponding probability of gaining the difference between the 
eighty legacy value and what they would receive by keeping a 
Bad Manager in the long term (i.e., zero). After this probability 
is weighted for the population of Bad Managers (20%), the ex-
pected gain to the shareholders for correctly firing a Bad Man-
ager is thirteen,243 which largely exceeds the expected cost they 
bear for firing a Good Manager. 
E. BENEFICIAL AND EXCESSIVE BOARD’S BIAS 
This last part of the numerical example addresses the 
function of a board’s bias. To this end, as in Part IV.C, the ex-
ample poses that the board’s bias, β, is equal to 0.2 so that the 
shareholders will deem a manager to be Good at the end of the 
short term after observing a zero payoff with probability 
0.2×1+(1–0.2)×0.471=57.7 (where 0.471 is the shareholders’ 
unbiased posterior belief under the same short-term realiza-
tion). Under this posterior the shareholders’ continuation pay-
 
 242. This amount is calculated as follows: (0.8×0.04)×[(0.88×250)-80]=4.5, 
where 0.8 is the probability of hiring a Good Manager, 0.04 is the probability 
that a Good Manager who selects the Innovative Project will generate two con-
secutive zero payoffs, (0.88×250) is the long-term shareholders’ payoff from the 
Innovative Project net of the manager’s equity incentives, and 80 is the share-
holders’ legacy value.  
 243. This amount is calculated as follows: (0.2×0.81)×80=13, where 0.2 is 
the probability of hiring a Bad Manager, 0.81 is the probability that a Bad 
Manager who selects a Bad Project generates two consecutive zero payoffs, 
and 80 is the shareholder payoff when the shareholders fire the manager in 
the medium term. 
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off becomes 171.2,244 which is higher than the legacy value of 
160. Therefore, the board will not remove the manager.245 
Now, if the board’s bias remained the same over time, it is 
easy to see that the board would remove the manager after ob-
serving two consecutive zero payoffs in the medium term. Un-
der these circumstances, the board’s posterior belief that the 
manager is Good is 32.2%.246 Based on this posterior, the share-
holders’ continuation payoff for retaining the manager for the 
long term is 0.88×(0.322×250)=73.4, which is lower than the 
legacy value of eighty the shareholders receive if the board re-
moves the manager.  
In actuality, however, it is plausible to assume that a 
board’s bias may increase over time due to greater entrench-
ment between boards and managers. Let us thus assume that 
in the medium term, the board’s bias increases from 0.2 to 0.3, 
which is a slight, conservative increase. Still, under this great-
er bias, the board’s posterior belief that the manager is Good 
upon two consecutive zero payoffs would increase to 41.6%.247 
As a result, the board would mistakenly assess the shareholder 
continuation value for retaining the manager as being equal to 
0.88×(0.416×250)=91.4, which is higher than the legacy value of 
eighty. Therefore, a biased board in the long term would not 
remove the manager, reducing shareholder and firm value.  
 
 244. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they 
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 47.1% is determined as fol-
lows: 0.88×[0.577×(0.8×100+250)+0.423×(0.1×100)]=171.2. 
 245. The assumption here is that the board is biased “in good faith” and 
hence will consider the shareholders’ continuation payoff based on its own up-
dated posterior of the manager’s type to decide on the manager’s removal. 
However, even in the case of a board that is biased “in bad faith,” the share-
holders’ continuation payoff may still matter to the board as a reference point 
to consider to avoid a possible fiduciary action. 
 246. When the bias β=0.2, the board’s posterior is (0.8×16.5)+(0.2×1)=0.322. 
 247. When the bias β=0.3, the board’s posterior is (0.7×16.5)+(0.3×1)=0.416. 
